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Introduction
"Docudrama. n. a fictionalized dramatization for television of an actual
event or about a real person or people."'
A docudrama, by definition, would seem to be a contradiction. It is
a hybrid of both fact and fiction. It is just this characteristic which may
give rise to legal liability for those who produce fact-based dramas. This
article is intended to set forth the potential liabilities such producers face,
to define and discuss briefly the various causes of action available to
plaintiffs who sue the media,2 and to explore the practical solutions to
limiting such liability.
A. Docudrama: A Popular Form of Entertainment
Since its inception, the docudrama has become an increasingly pop-
ular and profitable form of television entertainment.' While the
docudrama has had numerous critics since its earliest days,4 this has not
seemed to hamper the media's output or the public's enthusiasm for the
form. Docudrama is the presentation of choice whenever there is a sen-
sational murder,5 titillating love triangle,6 heroic rescue, 7 personal tri-
umph,8 or event of historical importance. 9 In a recent sweeps period,' °
1. WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 540 (2d ed. 1983); con-
trary to Webster's definition, the term docudrama has also been used to refer to fact-based
theatrical features; in this article the term is used to include both, while the focus is on televi-
sion productions.
2. Throughout this article the term "media" will be used broadly to include television,
theatrical film, and print publications.
3. Steve Weinstein, A Quarter-Century of Television Movies . .The Historical View, L.A.
TIMES, April 23, 1989, at C24.
4. Lionel S. Sobel, The Trials and Tribulations of Producing Docu-Dramas: Tales of Eliz-
abeth Taylor, John DeLorean and Network Program Standards, 5 ENT. L. REP. 3, 4-5 (1983).
5. See, e.g., Fatal Vision (NBC television broadcast, Nov. 18-19, 1984) (former green
beret convicted of murdering his pregnant wife and two daughters); The Billionaire Boys Club
(NBC television broadcast, Nov. 8-9, 1987) (greedy yuppies murder for money).
6. See, e.g., Love, Lies and Murder (NBC television broadcast, Feb. 17-18, 1991) (hus-
band manipulates his daughter and his wife's sister, who was also his lover, into killing his
wife).
7. See, e.g., Everybody's Baby: The Rescue of Jessica McClure (ABC television broad-
cast, May 21, 1989) (heroic rescue of toddler trapped in abandoned well).
8. See, e.g., The Ryan White Story (ABC television broadcast, Jan. 16, 1989) (teenager
with AIDS fought prejudice, discrimination, and misconceptions about the disease); Victims
for Victims: The Theresa Saldana Story (NBC television broadcast, Nov. 12, 1984) (actress'
recovery from near-fatal attack by fan and founding of victims' support group).
9. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade (NBC television broadcast, May 15, 1989) (events surrounding
landmark abortion decision); Kent State (NBC television broadcast, Feb. 8, 1981) (tragic con-
frontation between anti-Vietnam war protesters and National Guard); Judge Horton and the
Scottsboro Boys (NBC television broadcast, Apr. 22, 1976) (controversial rape trial of three
black youths in the South of the 1930s).
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NBC's broadcast of Love, Lies and Murder placed second for the week,
and ABC's first installment of the mini-series And The Sea Will Tell, I I a
fact-based story of murder on the high seas, placed third for the week.
12
Docudramas provide the public with a voyeuristic journey into the lives
of celebrities and other people in the news-a catharsis-an opportunity
to release pent-up emotions in an entertaining way. Thus, it is easy to see
why they are so popular.
The aspects of docudramas which make them subject to liability are
the "very characteristics that go to make up the docudrama-invented
dialogue, impersonation and concocted scenes."13 These characteristics
are virtually a necessity unless the docudrama is based solely on trial
transcripts."4 Elizabeth Taylor, who sued ABC to prevent the produc-
tion of a docudrama based on her life,15 objected to the use of the form
because of its inherent inaccuracies. She aptly stated that any telefilm
based on her life would have to be fictionalized "unless there was some-
body under the carpet or under the bed during my 50 years." 1 6 Because
a certain degree of fictionalization is a necessary component of the
docudrama, courts have given docudrama producers a great deal of lee-
way," based primarily on the free speech privilege afforded the media by
the First Amendment." Media defendants may also raise defenses
grounded in consent, privilege, and disclaimers. Although plaintiffs'
prospects for winning lawsuits have been significantly reduced by the
courts, plaintiffs continue to sue by alleging they have had their lives
disrupted, feelings hurt, privacy invaded, reputations damaged or lost, or
have suffered similar harm. Ultimately, the best defense against this type
10. "Sweeps period" is a period in which the network advertising rates are set for the
following year based on the number of viewers tuned in during that period. Consequently,
networks broadcast their most watched programs during that time.
11. ABC television broadcast, Feb. 24, 1991.
12. Per A.C. Nielsen ratings for the week of Feb. 18, 1991. DAILY VARIETY, Feb. 27,
1991, at 22.
13. Hansen, Docudrama-Invented Dialogue, Impersonation and Concocted Scenes: Be-
ware of Lurking Lawsuits, 5 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 1, 14 (Spring 1987).
14. Gerdes, Docudramas: No Shortcuts in the Clearance Process, 16 L.A. LAW. 35, 36
(Apr. 1990).
15. Taylor v. American Broadcasting Co., No. 82 Civ. 6977 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
16. Sobel, supra note 4, at 3.
17. See, e.g., Davis v. Costa-Gavras, 654 F. Supp. 653, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("Leeway is
properly afforded to an author who thus attempts to recount a true event.").
18. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press .... ") The United States Supreme Court first acknowledged that
motion pictures were entitled to First Amendment protection in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wil-
son, 343 U.S. 495, 501-502 (1952) ("The importance of motion pictures as an organ of public
opinion is not lessened by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to inform....
[E]xpression by means of motion pictures is included within the free speech and free press
guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.").
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of litigation is diligent legal analysis and informed decisionmaking
throughout the various phases of any project's production.
B. Producing Docudramas
The idea for a docudrama may come from a newspaper article,19
magazine story,2' television news report,21 historical event,22 celebrity's
life,23 or book.24 Once a producer or development executive has ex-
pressed an interest in a particular subject, he or she needs to determine
how to approach the subject matter of the docudrama. From a practical
standpoint, there are two ways to approach producing a fact-based
drama: by acquiring rights25 or by using public domain sources. Several
factors should be considered when making this decision: from whom
could the rights be acquired? Is that person likely to consent? Are there
alternative sources for the rights? Are there laws which may affect ac-
quisition of the rights? Are the rights still available? How costly will the
rights be? Can the project be made without securing the rights? A major
factor in this decision is the type of story the producer wishes to drama-
tize. It is more likely that the rights will be acquired when portraying a
heroic or courageous story,26 recent news event,27 or authorized biogra-
phy,2" than when the topic involves historical events,29 unauthorized bi-
19. See, e.g., Family of Spies: The Walker Spy Ring (CBS television broadcast, Feb. 3,
1989) (American family sold secrets to Soviet Union).
20. See, e.g., The Longest Night (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 12, 1972) (kidnapped
heiress buried in underground enclosure).
21. See, e.g., I Know My First Name is Steven (NBC television broadcast, May 22, 1989)
(kidnapped boy raised by child molester); The Atlanta Child Murders (CBS television broad-
cast, Feb. 10 & 12, 1985) (serial murders of children in Atlanta).
22. See, e.g., Washington: Behind Closed Doors (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 6-11,
1977) (John Ehrlichman's version of Watergate).
23. See, e.g., Second Serve (CBS television broadcast, May 13, 1986) (autobiography of
transsexual tennis star Renee Richards); Rock Hudson (ABC television broadcast, Jan. 8,
1990).
24. See, e.g., Missing (Universal Pictures 1982) (journalist's account of the death of an
American in Chile during the violent coup); Murder in Texas (NBC television broadcast, May
3-4, 1981) (sensational murder trial of prominent plastic surgeon accused of killing first wife;
based on book by second wife).
25. Rights may be acquired from a number of sources, including the subjects of the
drama, journalists, and investigators. This article will focus primarily on acquiring rights from
the parties depicted.
26. See, e.g., The Ted Kennedy, Jr. Story (NBC television broadcast, Nov. 24, 1986) (fa-
mous senator's son battled cancer); MA.D.D.: Mothers Against Drunk Drivers (NBC television
broadcast, Mar. 14, 1983) (story of founder of M.A.D.D.).
27. See, e.g., Challenger (ABC television broadcast, Feb. 24, 1989) (tragic crash of space
shuttle); Everybody's Baby: The Rescue of Jessica McClure, supra note 7.
28. See, e.g., Mayflower Madam (CBS television broadcast, Nov. 15, 1987) (upscale pros-
titution service headed by Mayflower descendant Sydney Biddle Barrows); Mafia Princess
(NBC television broadcast, Jan. 19, 1986) (Antoinette Giancana's account of her life as the
daughter of a Chicago Mafia boss).
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ographies of celebrities,3" or sensational crimes.31 Each approach has its
advantages and disadvantages. This article will carefully analyze the po-
tential risks of each method and will provide a foundation from which a
producer may make informed decisions before entering into the develop-
ment or production of a docudrama.3'
II
Potential Liabilities When Rights Are Not Secured
A. Introduction
Many of the lawsuits involving docudramas result from productions
in which rights were not secured.33 The potential areas of liability for
media defendants are defamation (libel), invasion of privacy, false light
invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, right of
publicity, and copyright infringement. The interests protected by these
laws are both personality interests (e.g., reputation, privacy, emotional
tranquility) and property interests (e.g., right of publicity, copyright). As
a practical matter, suits sounding in libel law are substantially limited by
virtue of the United States Supreme Court's decisions in New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan34 and its progeny; therefore, the primary risks lie in the
privacy area.35 The celebrity plaintiff may have additional avenues avail-
able such as causes of action based on right of publicity and misappropri-
ation. Finally, copyright infringement should not be overlooked; writers
must be careful of the way in which source material is used. The follow-
ing section will explore the evolution of these causes of action, evaluate
the current status of the law, and analyze the impact of these rights on
the production of docudramas.
29. See, e.g., Charles & Diana: A Royal Love Story (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 17,
1982); The Trial of Lee Harvey Oswald (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 30 & Oct. 2, 1977).
30. See, e.g., A Woman Called Golda (syndicated broadcast, Apr. 26 & 28, 1982); Elvis
(ABC television broadcast, Feb. 11, 1979).
31. See, e.g., The Preppy Murder (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 24, 1989) (college stu-
dent killed in Central Park by lover); Nutcracker: Money, Madness and Murder (NBC televi-
sion broadcast, Mar. 22-24, 1987) (New York socialite convicted of manipulating her son to
murder her frugal father; rights purchased from journalist, not subjects).
32. From a practical standpoint, the distributors (e.g., networks, studios) and insurance
companies will often dictate which route the producer must take; however, since both ap-
proaches are commonly used, this article will take the position that there is such a choice to be
made by the producer.
33. Tort liability is a much more serious risk, as judgments can be very high (punitive
damages are available), and foresecability is not always possible. In contrast, lawsuits based on
breach of contract run a lower risk of large judgments, as there are no punitive damages avail-
able, and such suits should be more foreseeable and avoidable.
34. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (public official must prove defendant published with actual malice
or reckless disregard of the truth).
35. Hansen, supra note 13, at 14.
(Vol. 14:483
DOCUDRAMAS
B. Defamation Law: Libel 36
1. History and Development
Defamation law was developed to protect a person's interest in his
or her reputation-the way in which an individual is perceived by
others. a7 Under the common law, a plaintiff could win a libel suit by
showing that a false and defamatory statement had been made and that
he or she had suffered harm as a result.38 There was no requirement for
culpability on the part of a defendant, and innocent violators were pun-
ished; it was a strict liability offense. In 1964, the United States Supreme
Court constitutionalized libel law when it handed down its controversial
decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 39 The case involved an ad-
vertisement placed in the New York Times, which was a solicitation for
money to support civil rights activities such as student protests, the
struggle for voting rights, and the legal defense of Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr. The text of the advertisement criticized the Montgomery, Ala-
bama Police Department. Although he was not specifically named in the
ad, Montgomery's Commissioner of Public Affairs subsequently sued for
defamation.' The Alabama Supreme Court upheld a verdict for the
plaintiff.4 The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that
while the ad contained some inaccurate descriptions of events, it was a
permissible publication.42 The Court reasoned that criticism of public
officials43 and comment upon public issues is protected by the First
Amendment, and a rule curtailing this freedom would have a "chilling
effect" on the media:
A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth
of all his factual assertions-and to do so on pain of libel judgments
virtually unlimited in amount-leads to a comparable "self-censor-
ship."... Under such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct may
be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is in fact true,
because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the ex-
pense of having to do so.... The constitutional guarantees require, we
think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering
36. Defamatory statements by media defendants have been considered libel, rather than
slander, even when orally uttered. Libel is the "publication" of a false statement. Exhibition
of a film is considered to be a publication.
37. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 739 (4th ed. 1971).
38. Id.
39. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
40. Id. at 256.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 264.
43. "The category of public officials includes not only those who are commonly classified
as public officers but also public employees who exercise any substantial governmental power."
W.P. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 113, at 806 (5th ed.
1984).
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damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct un-
less he proves that the statement was made with "actual malice"-that
is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not."
Media defendants were granted even greater protection by the Court
When it extended the "actual malice" standard created in New York
Times to include public figures.45 The standard of culpability applicable
for private figures was set forth in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 46 in which
the Court held that a private figure could recover for defamation upon a
showing of mere negligence. The rationale for this lower standard was
that the plaintiffs had not "voluntarily exposed themselves to increased
risk of injury from defamatory falsehood, '47 and did not have access to
the media for rebuttal, and were therefore more vulnerable to injury and
more deserving of recovery. The Court's ruling allowed the states to set
any standard of fault with regard to private figures except strict liability
and maintained the "actual malice" standard for awarding punitive dam-
ages. In its most recent landmark case in this area, Philadelphia Newspa-
pers, Inc. v. Hepps,41 the Supreme Court held that when a defamatory
statement regarding a matter of public concern is published about a pri-
vate figure, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the falsity of the state-
ment in order to recover. By placing the burden on the plaintiff to prove
falsity, rather than on the defendant to prove truth, the Court further
expanded protection for media defendants in the area of defamation.
2. Current Standards for Liability
Libel is a false and unprivileged publication by writing, printing, pic-
ture, effigy, or other fixed representation to the eye, which exposes any
person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him
to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his
occupation. 49
This California libel statute is a representative model. While each
state has its own statute for defamation, the elements which are neces-
sary to prove defamation are basically the same. The fundamental re-
quirements are the following: (1) The statement must be a false
44. 376 U.S. at 279-80. In March, the Court affirmed its broad definition of "public offi-
cial" when it declined to reinstate a defamation action brought by a social worker whose life
had be destroyed by a "substantially false" news article. THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, Mar.
19, 1991, at 3.
45. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 380 U.S. 130 (1967) (university coach held to be a
public figure; in a consolidated case, Associated Press v. Walker, a retired army general was
held to be a public figure).
46. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
47. Id. at 345.
48. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
49. CAL. CIv. CODE § 45 (West 1992).
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statement of fact which may injure reputation, (2) the statement must be
"of and concerning" the plaintiff, and (3) the requisite standard of culpa-
bility must be met (i.e., negligence in publishing the statement if the
plaintiff is a private figure or actual malice or reckless disregard if the
plaintiff is a public figure or public official). Each of these three elements
must be proven in order for a plaintiff to recover.
The first element has two components: the statement of fact must be
false and it must be defamatory. Dean Prosser defined a statement as
defamatory if it "tends... to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or
confidence in which the plaintiff is held, or if it tends to excite adverse,
derogatory, or unpleasant feelings or opinions"50 about the plaintiff.
What is or is not defamatory may vary among the jurisdictions; values
and mores differ"1 and, therefore, infallible predictions on this issue can-
not be made. In some cases, however, the defendant will be able to argue
that the plaintiff is "libel-proof" and therefore could not be defamed.
This is particularly true when the plaintiff is a criminal.52
With regard to falsity, the vast majority of docudramas present a
unique problem: scenes will be created and the dialogue, for the most
part, will be invented. Therefore, statements uttered by the characters
and imagined scenes are technically false. Most courts, however, hold
that such "author's license" is a necessary and appropriate use, and not
actionable if the scenes contain the "essence of truth."53 Another aspect
of the tort is that the false statement be one of fact. In Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., the Supreme Court stated, "[T]here is no such thing as a
false idea."'54 In other words, if the statement is an opinion, it is not
actionable as a false statement of fact. Distinguishing between opinion
and fact has often been difficult for courts; the standard applied is
"whether the ordinary reader would perceive the statement as fact or
opinion."55 Courts interpreted Gertz as giving complete constitutional
protection to opinions, making them not actionable. In June 1990, how-
ever, the Supreme Court withdrew this unlimited right and held that the
50. PROSSER, supra note 37, at 739.
51. Many media defendants can be sued anywhere, as the requirements for personal juris-
diction can easily be met (i.e., mass media has "minimum contacts" with all jurisdictions).
Therefore, the success or failure of a defamation suit may depend on where it is brought.
52. See, e.g., Cardillo v. Doubleday & Co., 518 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1975) (book linking
plaintiff to Mafia activities not actionable as plaintiff was in the federal penitentiary on numer-
ous felony convictions).
53. Davis v. Costa-Gavras, 654 F. Supp. 653, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). See also Street v.
National Broadcasting Co., 645 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 454 U.S. 815, cert. dis-
missed, 454 U.S. 1095 (1981) (literal falsehoods were not actionable since program was accu-
rate in all material respects).
54. 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
55. Gerdes, supra note 14, at 37.
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First Amendment does not require a special opinion privilege. 56 Declar-
ing that the passage from Gertz had been misinterpreted, the Court
stated that it had not "intended to create a wholesale defamation excep-
tion for anything that might be labelled 'opinion.'"" Instead, the Court
explained, the culpability requirements and constitutional protections af-
forded media defendants via its previous decisions in New York Times,
Curtis Publishing Co., Gertz, and Philadelphia Newspapers were sufficient
to "ensure that debate on public issues remains 'uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open.' "
As a result, the standards applicable to defamation claims based on
factual statements are equally applicable to claims based on opinion
statements. While the burden of proving falsity is on the plaintiff, and
truth is an absolute defense to a claim of defamation, lengthy litigation
could prove costly; hence, relying exclusively on this defense may be
unwise.
The next element in a defamation action is that the false and defam-
atory statement must be "of and concerning" the plaintiff. This element
is particularly relevant in the context of docudrama. Identification of the
plaintiff as the character portrayed may be difficult. Docudramas often
contain characters which are hybrids of actual people, known as compos-
ite characters, and the names of those characters may have been
changed. Using composite characters can be particularly appropriate
when the individual depicted is portrayed in a possibly defamatory man-
ner. The object is to combine more than one person into one character
and to blend their characteristics so much that "no one person can claim
to be the one portrayed." 59 Changing a character's name also may be
useful to dispute this element, but it should not provide the producer
with a false sense of security. In a controversial case regarding the "of
and concerning" element, Bindrim v. Mitchell, 60 a California court held
that even a fictional character in a novel could be a defamatory portrayal
if "a reasonable person, reading the book, would understand that the
fictional character therein pictured was, in actual fact, the plaintiff acting
as described.", 6' By allowing a plaintiff to prevail against an author of a
fictional work, the court eliminated the need to prove fault-the pub-
56. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Interview with Patricia Clifford, Executive Vice-President of Television, Interscope
Communications, in Westwood, Cal. (Mar. 28, 1991).
60. 155 Cal. Rptr. 29 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979) (writer attended a nude
encounter therapy session led by plaintiff, then wrote a novel in which the nude therapist was
portrayed as using vulgar language and making advances at patients).
61. Id. at 78.
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lisher of a "novel" intentionally publishes something false. This applica-
tion is a distortion of the New York Times standard, and the Supreme
Court has yet to rule on the issue and clarify an appropriate standard for
fictional works.
Another component of this analysis is that the portrayal must be
believable in order to be actionable. This was the crucial distinction
made in Pring v. Penthouse International Ltd. ,62 in which the court held
that although the plaintiff could be identified as the Miss Wyoming de-
scribed in the Penthouse article, the article clearly depicted events which
"could not reasonably be understood as a statement of fact."' 63 The case
was dismissed on appeal for failure to show a false statement of fact.
Hence, a motion for summary judgment is often successful at this stage
of the proceedings if the defendant can show it is not reasonable to con-
clude that the plaintiff is the character portrayed or if the portrayal is not
believable.
The final element to be proven is the requisite level of culpability on
the part of the defendant-actual malice if the plaintiff is a public figure
or official and negligence if the plaintiff is a private figure. The determi-
nation of the court" of whether the complaining party is a public or
private figure is crucial because a public figure or official has little chance
of recovery.65 Obvious public figures include "prominent personalities,
either in their sphere of employment or in their activities conducted in
view of the general population. ' 66 The more difficult category to classify
are those people who have not voluntarily exposed themselves to the pub-
lic eye but have become newsworthy because of a particular event.67 The
Supreme Court has separated these two groups of people into general
public figures and limited public figures. 6 A general public figure is de-
scribed as "an individual [who] may achieve such pervasive fame or no-
toriety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all
contexts,, 69 whereas a limited public figure is "an individual [who] vol-
62. 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982) (Miss Wyoming's talent in the Miss America pageant
was described as a performance of complex sexual acts while levitating her boyfriend and
coach).
63. Id. at 441.
64. This classification is determined as a matter of law, and therefore the decision is made
by the judge.
65. But see Burnett v. National Enquirer, Inc., 493 N.Y.S.2d 326 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (defend-
ant liable for false and uncorroborated reports depicting Carol Burnett as drunk and boister-
ous in a restaurant).
66. M. MAYER, THE LIBEL REVOLUTION: A NEW LOOK AT DEFAMATION AND PRI-
VACY 26 (1987).
67. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (family held hostage by escaped
convicts).
68. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
69. Id. at 351.
1992] DOCUDRAMAS
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
untarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy
and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues."'70
The limited public figure distinction has benefitted media defendants
when historical events are dramatized years after their occurrence. A
frequently cited example is Street v. National Broadcasting Co.,7  where
one of the prosecuting witnesses in the famous Scottsboro Boys rape trial
sued NBC over her portrayal in the network's docudrama. Although the
telefilm was produced forty years after the events depicted, the Sixth Cir-
cuit held that "once a person becomes a public figure in connection with
a particular controversy, that person remains a public figure thereafter
for purposes of later commentary or treatment of that controversy."72
The court found no evidence of actual malice because the docudrama
had been carefully researched and documented; thus, the ruling in favor
of the defendants was affirmed.73 The public figure/private figure dichot-
omy was also applied to the docudrama context in Davis v. Costa-
Gavras, 4 in which the State Department and military personnel sued for
defamation, alleging that in the film Missing they were portrayed as ac-
quiescing in the murder of a United States citizen in Chile. The plaintiffs
were deemed to be public figures, and therefore the "actual malice" stan-
dard of New York Times was required. The case was subsequently dis-
missed on a motion for summary judgment because the district court
concluded that the plaintiffs did not have clear and convincing affirma-
tive evidence of actual malice.75
One final consideration in assessing potential liability is whether the
person depicted is living or dead. There is no cause of action in defama-
tion for a deceased person. Consequently, docudramas depicting the
lives of deceased celebrities are only at risk from the secondary living
characters portrayed. This may account for the abundance of biographi-
cal docudramas produced shortly after a celebrity's death.76
As a practical matter, most docudrama portrayals of major charac-
ters fall within the public official or public figure categories. After all, if
the individual was not at least a limited public figure, why would the
network produce the telefilm? Therefore, for a plaintiff to succeed, he or
70. Id. This distinction is also relevant in the area of invasion of privacy, discussed infra,
notes 79-126 and accompanying text.
71. 645 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir. 1981).
72. Id. at 1235.
73. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, but the case was dismissed when the parties
settled.
74. 619 F. Supp. 1372 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
75. Id. at 1386.
76. See, e.g., Rock Hudson, supra note 23; The Karen Carpenter Story (CBS television
broadcast, Jan. 1, 1989); Liberace (ABC television broadcast, Oct. 2, 1988) and Liberace: Be-
hind the Music (CBS television broadcast, Oct. 9, 1988).
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she would have to prove actual malice or reckless disregard of the truth.
This is virtually unprovable in the television docudrama context. The
networks' clearance processes are thorough and provide ample evidence
to rebut a claim of recklessness. 77 Consequently, due to the difficult ob-
stacles for plaintiffs in defamation actions, there has been a rise in litiga-
tion in other areas of tort law such as invasion of privacy, false light
invasion of privacy, right of publicity, and misappropriation.7"
C. Invasion of Privacy
1. History and Development
In the late nineteenth century, two legal scholars wrote what is con-
sidered to be "one of the most famous and influential law review articles
ever published .... [I]t single-handedly started a new field of law in the
United States.",79 The scholars were Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren,
and the new field of law was privacy. 0 Warren and Brandeis were con-
cerned about the increase in "yellow journalism"' I and the new technolo-
gies which made it easier to invade "the sacred precincts of private and
domestic life .... " The press had free reign to publish private, embar-
rassing information about people, and there was no legal remedy avail-
able. 3 Brandeis and Warren asserted that people had "the right to enjoy
life-the right to be let alone,"8 4 and therefore there must be a remedy
because the "press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds
of propriety and of decency."8 5 The interest sought to be protected was
"the right to be let alone," an interest distinctly different from the inter-
est in one's reputation protected by defamation law.
The impact of the Brandeis and Warren article was not immediately
apparent. However, two cases decided in the early twentieth century led
to the legal recognition of this concept of privacy. In 1902, Abigail Rob-
erson sued Rochester Folding Box Company for using her photograph in
77. Sobel, supra note 4, at 6. See discussion on Script Clearance infra notes 351.63 and
accompanying text.
78. Hansen, supra note 13, at 14.
79. J. MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1-8 (1990).
80. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
81. "The use of lurid features and sensationalized news in newspaper publishing to attract
readers and increase circulation." 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 832 (15th ed. 1986).
82. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 80, at 195.
83. In the event that the information published was true, defamation was not an available
cause of action.
84. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 80, at 193.
85. Id. at 196.
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advertisements for their flour.8 6 Roberson claimed that the ad had hu-
miliated her and resulted in physical illness which had left her confined
to bed. 7 In a 4-3 decision, the New York Court of Appeals denied her
relief, holding that there was no law under which relief could be granted.
The decision led to a "storm of public disapproval"8" which resulted in
the New York Legislature's enactment of the nation's first right of pri-
vacy statute:
A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or for
the purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person
without having first obtained the written consent of such person... is
guilty of a misdemeanor.8 9
Although this statute only covered advertising uses, it was the first step
toward the codification of the right of privacy.
Three years later, the Georgia Supreme Court became the first court
to acknowledge the law of privacy.' In Pavesich v. New England Life
Insurance Co., the plaintiff's photograph had been used in the defend-
ant's advertisement for life insurance. The ad was a "before and after"
look at two men: plaintiff was featured as the "before" client above the
caption: "In my healthy and productive period of life I bought insurance
... and to-day my family is protected .... ,1 The plaintiff never had a
policy with the company, and he complained of ridicule, invasion of pri-
vacy and libel. The Georgia Court recognized a common law right to
privacy, which has "its foundation in the instincts of nature... [and] is
therefore derived from natural law."92
Thereafter, the right of privacy evolved in many directions through-
out the United States and more narrow subtorts under the general cate-
gory of invasion of privacy were created. In 1960, the body of case law
and statutory law which had developed was organized by Dean Prosser
in his influential law review article Privacy. 93 Prosser proposed a four-
part scheme, which was later adopted by the Restatement of Torts and
most courts.94 The four separate privacy categories Prosser outlined are
the following: 95
86. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 71 N.Y.S. 876 (Sup. Ct. 1901), rev'd, 64 N.E.
442 (N.Y. 1902).
87. Id. at 878.
88. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 385 (1960) [hereinafter Privacy].
89. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW, ch. 132, sec. 1-2, §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1921).
90. 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
91. Id. at 69.
92. Id. at 69-70.
93. Privacy, supra note 88.
94. MCCARTHY, supra note 79, § 1-2.
95. PROSSER, supra note 37, at 804-14.
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1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his pri-
vate affairs.
96
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff.
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye.
4. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's
name or likeness.
These torts offer protection previously unavailable to the plaintiff
who is suing the media and must be carefully considered by producers
depicting living real people. 97
2. Public Disclosure of Private Facts
The tort that Brandeis and Warren were concerned about is embod-
ied in Prosser's second type of privacy, that which involves public disclo-
sure of embarrassing facts. Prosser provides a three-part test for this
tort:
1. There must be a public disclosure of private facts;
2. The facts disclosed must be private facts; and
3. The matter made public must be one which would be offensive and
objectionable to a reasonable man of ordinary sensibilities. 98
As applied to the docudrama context, the first prong of the test would
not be at issue. A television broadcast is indisputably public. With re-
gard to the second prong, Prosser indicated that "anything visible in a
public place" had been held to be public,99 as well as matters of public
record.lO The questionable cases typically arise when undesirable facts,
long forgotten, are brought back to the public's attention. The leading
case on this issue is Melvin v. Reid... (a.k.a. The Red Kimono case), in
which the plaintiff, who was once a prostitute and a defendant in a noto-
rious murder trial, had been rehabilitated and led an exemplary life after
her acquittal. Seven years after the trial, the defendant produced a film,
The Red Kimono, based upon the actual events-in essence a
docudrama-using the plaintiff's real name. The release of the film ru-
96. The first type of tort deals primarily with physical intrusions, such as police searches,
and therefore further discussion is beyond the scope of this article.
97. As with defamation, invasion of privacy does not survive the death of an individual.
Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979). California law grants the deceased
personality's assignee or statutory successor the exclusive right of publicity in the deceased
celebrity's name, voice, photo, likeness, etc., for advertising and selling uses. CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 990 (West 1992). However, literary and dramatic uses are specifically exempt, thereby mak-
ing this statutory right inapplicable to the docudrama.
98. PROSSER, supra note 37, at 809-12.
99. Id. at 811. See, e.g., Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 253 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1953) (man
photographed embracing his wife in public marketplace).
100. PROSSER, supra note 37, at 811. See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting v. Cohen, 420 U.S. 469
(1974) (publication of rape victim's name permissible); Meetze v. Associated Press, 95 S.E.2d
606 (S.C. 1956) (publication of date of birth and marriage); Stryker v. Republic Pictures Corp.,
238 P.2d 670 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951) (publication of military service record).
101. 297 P. 91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931).
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ined her life by revealing her past to the world and her friends."°2 The
court found this to be an actionable claim for invasion of privacy because
it was an unnecessary intrusion.10 3
The types of revelations which violate the third prong are measured
by an objective "reasonable person" standard. In order to be actionable,
the facts revealed must be more than merely trivial, and the publication
must be highly objectionable or offensive and "unrelated to any legiti-
mate public interest."'" Therefore, the plaintiff, a former child prodigy
who later led a secluded life, was not able to recover, even though an
article revealing his present life was emotionally devastating to him.10 5
While the court felt that New Yorker Magazine's article about the plain-
tiff was a merciless exposure with little apparent object but that of pan-
dering to the curiosity of the public, it acknowledged that the mores of
the community are such that "the misfortunes of and frailties of neigh-
bors and 'public figures' are of considerable interest ... to the rest of the
population."'' ° Although the court ruled in favor of the defendant, it
articulated a standard beyond which the media may not proceed: a pub-
lication would not be protected if it made "revelations... so intimate...
and unwarranted ... as to outrage the community's notions of de-
cency."' 1 7 This standard has been widely recognized by the courts and
often cited.'08
Once evidence supporting the three factors has been established, the
court is faced with balancing the conflict between the interests of the
media to publish newsworthy information, as protected by the First
Amendment, and the rights of individuals to keep their private facts from
public view.
Nondefamatory portrayals are protected from liability if they are
deemed newsworthy or in the public interest, if they are partially in-
formative, or if they possess artistic merit .... As a result, the First
Amendment is the predominant factor in determining the scope of an
individual's right to sue the media for portrayals that impinge upon his
privacy. 10 9
102. PROSSER, supra note 37, at 809.
103. Melvin, 297 P. at 91.
104. MAYER, supra note 66, at 160.
105. Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940), affig 34 F. Supp. 19
(S.D.N.Y. 1938) (Sidis graduated from Harvard at 16, and as an adult lived a menial life).
106. Id. at 809.
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Leopold v. Levin, 259 N.E.2d 250, 256 (I11. 970) (plaintiff pleaded guilty to
the kidnapping and murder of a 14-year old boy; the crime attracted international attention).
109. Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, Privacy, Publicity and the Portrayal of Real
People by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1585 (1979).
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The issue then becomes clearer: under what circumstances does the bal-
ance tip in favor of the First Amendment, and therefore the media, and
when are the rights of the individual greater?
When balancing that equation, the courts consider whether the
plaintiff is a public or private figure and the length of time which has
elapsed since the public event occurred. These two concepts are interre-
lated. An individual may be a public figure at the time of a newsworthy
event but may regain private figure status by being out of the public eye
for a certain period of time.110 While the courts have substantially lim-
ited a public figure's right of privacy, reasoning that "they have sought
publicity and consented to it; ... their personalities and their affairs al-
ready have become public... [and] the press has a privilege, guaranteed
by the Constitution, to inform the public about those who have become
legitimate matters of public interest,"' I persons who have regained their
status as private figures do have legal recourse. This is particularly rele-
vant when disclosure of an individual's previous criminal history is
made. There is a strong public policy to rehabilitate people, allowing
them to lead respectable lives without the fear of having their past mis-
takes splashed across the headlines. The Red Kimono case is often cited
for this proposition," 2 as is Briscoe v. Reader's Digest,"3 in which
Reader's Digest published an article about the theft and highjacking of
trucks on America's highways. The article mentioned a truck highjack-
ing and subsequent police battle with the thief, Marvin Briscoe, but failed
to disclose that the event had occurred eleven years earlier. In fact, Bris-
coe had been rehabilitated and was living an exemplary life when the
article revealed his previous crime to his family and friends and subjected
him to scorn and abandonment. The court allowed recovery, stating that
Briscoe "has assumed a position in 'respectable' society.... The rights
guaranteed by the First Amendment do not require total abrogation of
the right to privacy,"1' 4 and it was unnecessary for the article to mention
Briscoe's name and reveal his identity.
In contrast, courts have held that some former criminals achieved
such notoriety that they will never be able to regain private figure status
with regard to those events. For example, NBC broadcast a dramatiza-
tion of the events surrounding the highly publicized pardon of convicted
110. See, e.g., Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931); Briscoe v. Reader's Digest,
483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971).
111. Privacy, supra note 88, at 826.
112. Melvin, 297 P. at 97 ("Where a person who has by his own efforts rehabilitated him-
. self, we, as right-thinking members of society, should permit him to continue in the path of
rectitude rather than throw him back into a life of shame or crime.").
113. Briscoe, 483 P.2d at 36.
114. Id. at 41-42.
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murderer Charles Bernstein and the journalist who helped win his free-
dom." 5 As in the cases of Melvin and Briscoe, Bernstein had "lived an
exemplary, virtuous, honorable.., and private life... and made many
friends who were not aware of the incidents of his earlier life." ' 6 How-
ever, in holding in favor of the defendant, the court was able to distin-
guish this case from those with contrary holdings. In both Melvin and
Briscoe the publication used the real name of the plaintiff, whereas NBC
had used a fictitious name and the facts were "sufficiently changed" to
conceal the plaintiff's identity." 7 In dealing with the issue of newswor-
thiness, the court held:
[A]s a matter of law.., a criminal proceeding widely publicized for a
period of at least eight years and containing elements of decided popu-
lar appeal does not lose its general public interest in a period of four
years or even twelve years; hence, republication in a reasonable man-
ner was privileged."'
The court compared the facts of this case to Sidis v. F-R Publishing
Corp., stating that there was a legitimate public interest in information
which "might be of current public value in pointing out to parents the
unhappy results of forcing a child prodigy into public notoriety."' '1 9
Another example where recovery was denied was in Leopold v.
Levin, 20 where the Illinois Supreme Court held that a novel and subse-
quent film "suggested" by the crime of the plaintiff did not violate his
right of privacy with regard to "matters associated with his participation
in that completely publicized crime." '121 Although the plaintiff's name
was not used in the novel, the defendants could not succeed in claiming
the plaintiff was not the character depicted; the hardcover jacket sleeve
read, "This book is a novel suggested by what is possibly the most fa-
mous and certainly one of the most shocking crimes ever committed in
America-the Leopold-Loeb murder case."' 22 Instead the defendant
won on the newsworthiness argument. The court stated that
115. The Big Story, telecast Jan. 18, 1952, reenacted Charles Bernstein's story, which was
highly publicized from his conviction in 1933 until his release in 1940. Although his real name
was not used, the name of the reporter who helped him, Martha Strayer, was used. NBC
promoted the program as "from the front pages of the Washington Daily News comes the Big
Story of reporter Martha Strayer, as she wrote it, as she lived it. A story of an innocent man in
death row marking days off a calendar-and a reporter's fight to save his life." Bernstein v.
National Broadcasting Co., 129 F. Supp. 817, 819 n.6 (D.D.C. 1955).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 836.
118. Id. at 835.
119. Id.
120. 259 N.E.2d 250 (Ill. 1970); See also Street v. National Broadcasting Co., 645 F.2d
1227 (6th Cir. 1981) (portrayal of key witness in Scottsboro Boys trial 40 years after the event
not invasion of privacy as event still newsworthy).
121. Leopold, 259 N.E.2d at 255.
122. Id. at 252.
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"[a] strong curiosity and social and news interest in the crime, the
prosecution, and Leopold remained. It is of some relevance, too, in
this consideration, that the plaintiff himself certainly did not appear to
seek retirement from public attention. The publication of the autobio-
graphical story and other writings and his providing interviews un-
questionably contributed to the continuing public interest in him and
the crime. ' 2
3
Even in a more sympathetic scenario, where victims of a notorious
crime sought recovery for invasion of privacy, such relief was denied be-
cause they were deemed still to be newsworthy.1 24 The case involved a
review of a Broadway play "inspired" by the Hill family's ordeal as hos-
tages in their home at the hands of three escaped convicts. 125 The
Supreme Court held that, although the family members had not volunta-
rily injected themselves into the public eye they had become public
figures and therefore had a diminished amount of privacy. Although the
case did not turn on the issue of public versus private figures, it is an
important case because it was the first time the Court applied the dual
standard analysis to the tort of invasion of privacy.126
When evaluating the possible liability for invasion of privacy claims
arising from public disclosures in the docudrama context, producers
must consider whether the disclosed facts are private (or previously dis-
closed to the public or a matter of public record), whether the facts
would be highly offensive to the average person, whether the event de-
picted is newsworthy (taking into account the length of time since its
occurrence and the nature of the event), and whether the person depicted
is a public or private figure.
D. False Light
Dean Prosser labelled the third type of privacy tort as false light
invasion of privacy. Prosser described this offense as "publicity that
places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye."' 27 For example, a
false statement attributed to the plaintiff in a news article, 2 a tabloid
123. Id. at 255.
124. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
125. The play, loosely based on the Hills' ordeal, was performed three years after the event.
Life Magazine's review of the play mentioned their names, although they had not consented to
the play nor been interviewed. The fictionalized version depicted the family as being subjected
to violence and abuse by their captors, when in fact the Hills were treated very well.
126. The decision was grounded primarily in a claim for false light invasion of privacy,
which is discussed infra.
127. Privacy, supra note 88, at 813.
128. Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974) (news article described
plaintiff's demeanor and attributed thoughts to her when in fact the interviewer never met
her).
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asserting a relationship between a producer and an actress,129 and a com-
pletely fictionalized biography 3 ' all were held to constitute this tort.
Courts have had difficulty defining this tort because there is some dispute
about its underlying purpose. Legal scholars disagree whether this tort is
related to defamation or invasion of privacy. The view adopted by a
court is critical to the legal analysis which follows it. Therefore, the
competing philosophies will be explored.
Dean Prosser viewed false light as akin to defamation, stating that
"[t]he interest protected is clearly that of reputation, with the same over-
tones of mental distress as in defamation."' 131 Prosser saw this tort as
providing a needed remedy which could be expanded "beyond the nar-
row limits of defamation."' 132 The primary distinction between defama-
tion and false light is that in a claim for false light the plaintiff does not
have to prove that the statement was defamatory. Instead, the plaintiff
need only show that he or she was placed in a false light before the public
and "(a) the false light in which the [plaintiff] was placed would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge
of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter
and the false light in which the [plaintiff] would be placed."' 133
The United States Supreme Court decided its first false light claim
in Time, Inc. v. Hill. 13' This case involved a family who had been held
hostage in their home by three escaped convicts. Life Magazine pub-
lished a review of a Broadway play "inspired" by their story. The article
inaccurately stated that the family had been subjected to violence and
abuse at the hands of the convicts. The Court held that false statements
about matters of public interest are inevitable and, unless published with
"knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth," they are
not actionable. 13  The Court's rationale follows:
We run a grave risk of serious impairment of the indispensable service
of a free press in a free society if we saddle the press with the impossi-
ble burden of verifying to a certainty the facts associated in news arti-
cles with a person's name, picture or portrait, particularly as related to
nondefamatory matter. 13
6
129. Fellows v. National Enquirer, Inc., 721 P.2d 97 (Cal. 1985) (tabloid labelled happily
married producer as "new man in [Angie's] life" when he was photographed next to Angie
Dickinson at a restaurant; in fact, he had never met her).
130. Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 233 N.E.2d 840 (N.Y. 1967), appeal dismissed, 393
U.S. 1046 (1969) (biography of baseball player completely fabricated).
131. Privacy, supra note 88, at 815.
132. Id. at 815-16.
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1987).
134. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
135. Id. at 388.
136. Id. at 389-90.
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Therefore, if the subject of the publication was a matter of public
interest, the Court mandated the application of the New York Times ac-
tual malice standard to false light claims. Hence, the issue in
docudramas is whether the use of invented dialogue and created scenes is
knowing falsity or reckless disregard of the truth. "A limited degree of
inaccuracy, falsity, fictionalization, or dramatization is usually permissi-
ble without giving rise to a false light privacy action." '137 For example,
Rasputin's murderer sued CBS when it broadcast a play reenacting the
events surrounding the Russian monk's assassination. I3 s The plaintiff's
complaint alleged falsity through manufactured dialogue and fictional-
ized events. The court, however, granted summary judgment for the de-
fendant, finding no violation of the plaintiff's reputation or personality
interests. 139
For some legal scholars, however, classifying false light claims as the
equivalent of defamation is incorrect because it is not the truth or falsity
of the statement which is the issue. Instead, it is argued, it is the publica-
tion of the statement itself which is actionable because the resulting harm
is due to the "mental stress from having been exposed to public view."'"
Professor Nimmer, for example, viewed false light as derivative of the
true facts disclosure tort. He wrote:
Once the false light cases are understood as a logical, even a necessary,
extension of the private facts cases, the fallacy of equating the false
light cases to defamation actions becomes apparent. The injury to the
plaintiff's peace of mind which results from the public disclosure of
private facts may be just as real where that which is disclosed is not
true. It would be absurd to hold that the publication of an intimate
fact creates liability, but that the defendant is immunized from liability
(though the injury to plaintiff's peace of mind is no less) if the intimate
"fact" publicly disclosed turns out not to be true, thus putting a pre-
mium on falsehood. 14
Furthermore, Nimmer asserted that if the statements presented, if true,
would not invade the plaintiff's privacy, then no cause of action for false
light should arise. Some courts agree with this approach. For example,
the Kentucky Court of Appeals noted:
In this overall first amendment controversy, what previously could not
be achieved through the tort law of libel and slander because of the
requirement of proving malice is now being "backdoored" through the
137. Hansen, supra note 13, at 19.
138. Youssoupoff v. CBS, 244 N.Y.S.2d 701 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
139. Id.
140. Ruth Walden & Emile Netzhammer, False Light Invasion of Privacy: Untangling the
Web of Uncertainty, 9 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 347, 374-75 (1987) (quoting Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 385 (1967)).
141. Melville B. Nimmer, The Right Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory
Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAL. L.R. 935, 963 (1968).
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tort of [false light] invasion of privacy. The resulting effect is a form of
prior restraint upon the press. 42
Similarly, the North Carolina Supreme Court has refused to recog-
nize this tort, holding that any recovery for false light would be a dupli-
cation of the protections afforded by libel and slander, and would "add to
the tension already existing between the first amendment and the law of
torts in cases of this nature."' 43 Even in New York, where Warren
Spahn had prevailed over the publisher of his fictionalized biography, a
recent Court of Appeals decision considered "[tlhe scope of this tort [to
be] sufficiently vague and its impact upon free expression sufficiently omi-
nous that [the court] has questioned whether the tort is cognizable in
New York."'
The divergence in current case law is caused by the uncertainty
about whether the "matter of public interest" standard set forth in Time,
Inc. v. Hill145 was overruled when the Supreme Court rejected that stan-
dard in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. " The Supreme Court's failure to
clarify the issue in Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co. 147 has led to
"disorder and confusion in the law."' 48 If false light is recognized as an
extension of privacy law, then media plaintiffs will only be able to recover
if the stringent matter-of-public-interest standard articulated in Time,
Inc. v. Hill is not met. This is obviously the preferable approach for
media defendants because it will provide virtual immunity on matters of
public concern. Because this issue remains unresolved, producers must
be wary of false light claims and review nondefamatory material with the
same diligence as material which is more obviously actionable.
E. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress protects still
another personality interest-"peace of mind."1 49 The courts have found
this to be a particularly troublesome tort because damages as a result of
mental suffering are difficult to measure, and the injuries may be falsi-
fied.' 5° Early judicial decisions refused to recognize this tort unless there
was an additional tort claim. Over time, however, the tort has slowly
142. Walden & Netzhammer, supra note 140, at 380 (citing Johnson v. Lexington Herald-
Leader, 9 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1365, 1367 (Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 1983)).
143. Id. at 381 (citing Renwick v. News & Observer, 312 S.E.2d 405, 413 (N.C. 1984)).
144. Kovner, The Great Docudrama Controversy-Elizabeth Taylor and ABC, 1 COMM.
LAW. 1, 8 (Spring 1983).
145. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
146. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
147. 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
148. Walden & Netzhamrnmer, supra note 140, at 381.
149. PROSSER, supra note 37, at 57.
150. Id.
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evolved and become an independent cause of action.'51 Even so, some
states still tie an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim to other
torts: "New York recognizes an action for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, but does not allow recovery for publication of 'embarrass-
ing facts' without a prerequisite showing that there was also actual
damage to reputation."' 52 Likewise, the California Supreme Court has
held that a plaintiff has no cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress against a publisher and author if "the very same acts
... were insufficient to support a cause of action for defamation."1 53 The
Illinois Supreme Court cautioned against wide recovery under this tort,
holding that "the law should aim to toughen the psyche of the citizen
rather than pamper it."' 54  Therefore, such claims will rarely be
successful.
In order to succeed on a claim, the plaintiff will have to show that
the defendant's action (1) was extreme and outrageous conduct beyond
all possible bounds of decency; (2) was intended to inflict emotional dis-
tress; (3) resulted in serious emotional distress; and (4) caused injury that
must be equivalent to that which a reasonable person would have suf-
fered. ' This is an extremely difficult test to meet, particularly with re-
gard to media defendants because of the additional burden of the First
Amendment privilege.' 56 The Reverend Jerry Falwell attempted to ex-
tend this tort to offensive publications about public figures in Falwell v.
Flynt. 15' This case presents a provocative look at intentional infliction of
emotional distress and its possible impact on the production of
docudramas.
The November 1983 issue of Hustler Magazine featured a parody of
a Campari advertising campaign which interviewed celebrities about
their "first time"-the first time they drank Campari, that is. The Hus-
tler parody featured televangelist Jerry Falwell talking about his "first
time" as that term is more commonly understood-stating that his first
time was an "incestuous rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse."' 58
151. Id.
152. Henry R. Kaufman, 50-State Survey, 1989 LIBEL DEFENSE RESOURCE CENTER 647
(1989).
153. Flynn v. Higham, 197 Cal. Rptr. 145, 147 (Ct. App. 1983).
154. Knierim v. Izzo, 174 N.E.2d 157, 164 (Ill. 1961).
155. PROSSER, supra note 37, at 56.
156. See, e.g., Blatty v. New York Times Co., 728 P.2d 1177, 1184 (Cal. 1986), cert. denied,
458 U.S. 934 (1988) ("a state's definition of a tort cannot undermine the requirements of the
First Amendment"); Pawelek v. Paramount Studios Corp., 571 F. Supp. 1082 (N.D. Ill. 1983)
(Polish jokes in motion picture Flashdance not actionable).
157. 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46 (1988).
158. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 48.
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Falwell was not amused and sued for libel, invasion of privacy, and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. The jury found in favor of the de-
fendant on the libel claim, finding that the parody "could not reasonably
be understood as describing actual facts,"' 59 but ruled in Falwell's favor
on the intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action. This
ruling was upheld by the Court of Appeals,'I ° which rejected defendant's
argument that the New York Times actual malice standard should apply.
Instead, the court reasoned that "the issue is whether [the advertise-
ment's] publication was sufficiently outrageous to constitute intentional
infliction of emotional distress." 6 ' This decision was extremely distres-
sing from the media's perspective because of its underlying principle that
"even if the story was not libelous (because nobody took it seriously as
purported 'truth'), it could still be the subject of a suit for damages,
purely because it made Falwell feel bad." 62 In essence, this judgment
allowed public figures to silence speech which they felt was offensive or
hurt their feelings.
Fortunately for the media, the United States Supreme Court re-
versed this ruling in a unanimous decision holding that the First Amend-
ment precluded public figures from recovering for intentional infliction of
emotional distress without a showing of actual malice. 63 The Court reit-
erated the constitutional standards of recovery for libel and defamation
(i.e., actual malice) and emphasized the "fundamental importance of the
free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and con-
cern."' In addition, the Court expressed concern over the "chilling ef-
fect" the lower court's ruling would have on political cartoonists and
satirists.16 5 The Court concluded that
[p]ublic figures and public officials may not recover for the tort of in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of publications such
as the one here at issue without showing in addition that the publica-
tion contains a false statement of fact which was made with 'actual
malice,' i.e., with knowledge that the statement was false or with reck-
less disregard as to whether or not it was true.1 66
What is disturbing about the opinion is its emphasis on the conclu-
sion that the advertisement could not "reasonably be understood as
describing actual facts" and therefore could not meet the requirement of
a false statement of fact (i.e., it was an opinion). The question remains,
159. Id. at 49 (citation omitted).
160. Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1270.
161. Id. at 1276.
162. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SUING THE PRESS 169 (1986).
163. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988).
164. Id. at 50.
165. Id. at 52.
166. Id. at 56.
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however, as to what impact the Court's recent ruling in Milkovich v. Lo-
rain Journal Co. 167 will have. If opinions are no longer afforded immu-
nity from liability, and parodies such as this one are obviously published
with knowledge of falsity, can one successfully argue that the publication
of an offensive, outrageous parody such as this is subject to liability? It
seems unlikely given the strong public interest in free speech, but the
potential litigation may in and of itself have a chilling effect on
expression.
F. Right of Publicity
Elizabeth Taylor once said, "I am my own commodity. I am my
own industry. The way I look, the way I sound, that is my industry and
if somebody else portrays me and fictionalizes my life, it is taking away
from me."' 68 Is she correct in claiming that she exclusively owns the
right to exploit her image? In a truly commercial sense, she is. The right
of publicity affords an individual the right to control the use of his or her
"name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness.., for purposes of ad-
vertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products ... without the
person's prior consent ... ." The issue which arises is whether a
docudrama falls within the statutory definition of a commercial use or
whether it is a protected form of expression under the First Amendment.
1. History and Development
To evaluate the status of the right of publicity and the direction in
which it is moving, it is important to briefly examine its development.
The right of publicity grew out of the right of privacy to protect an indi-
vidual's proprietary interest in his or her name or likeness. Because pub-
lic figures could not seek protection for commercial uses of their
personalities under a theory of invasion of privacy, 170 they argued for
protection under a common law right of publicity. 7' One writer credits
two events with laying the foundation for widespread recognition of this
tort:172  the 1953 decision in Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing
167. 497 U.S. 1 (1990) (no special constitutional privilege for opinions).
168. James Lewin, Celebrities, Courts Face Legal Issues in Docudramas, 85 L.A. DAILY J.,
Nov. 25, 1982, at 1 (quoting Elizabeth Taylor).
169. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 1991); see also N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51
(McKinney 1991) (prohibits the use of the name, portrait or picture of any living person for
advertising or trade purposes without consent).
170. Private figures can recover for commercial uses under the theory of invasion of pri-
vacy. See, e.g., Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 71 N.Y.S. 876 (Sup. Ct. 1901);
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
171. MCCARTHY, supra note 79, § 1-5.
172. Id. § 1-2.
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Gum"'3 and Professor Nimmer's 1954 law review article, The Right of
Publicity. 174 In Haelan Laboratories, Judge Jerome Frank was the first
jurist to recognize expressly the right of publicity. The case involved the
use of a baseball player's photograph on a baseball card enclosed with
chewing gum. The player had granted Haelan Laboratories an exclusive
right to use his photograph, and subsequently Haelan's competitor,
Topps Chewing Gum, also used the ballplayer's image. Judge Frank, in
reversing the lower court, created the "right of publicity," which ac-
knowledged the commercial value of a person's identity.
A year later, Professor Nimmer wrote an influential article analyz-
ing the "inadequacy of traditional legal theories in protecting publicity
values"' 75 of celebrities' personae, and encouraging acceptance of the
right of publicity as a necessary protection.'76 On the one hand, the
meaning of commercial exploitation has been easy for the courts to dis-
cern when the product or service was clearly commercial. I77 In addition,
when the defendant's news broadcast appropriated the plaintiff's entire
act, and the result was the decimation of his commercial livelihood, re-
covery was allowed.'7" On the other hand, First Amendment considera-
tions are still balanced against the plaintiff's economic interests.
Therefore, when the content of the commercial use is also newsworthy,
the balance may tip in favor of the defendant.
For example, a New York court held that a poster with a photo-
graph of the television comedian Pat Paulsen accompanied by the slogan
"For President" was constitutionally protected expression because it
dealt with a matter of public interest.' 79 While the public interest is
weighty, there are limitations. The actual malice standard of New York
Times has been applied to cases where violation of the right of publicity
is claimed regarding a false publication. 8 ° In applying the right of pub-
licity, some commentators have suggested dividing the category of "ce-
lebrities" into political or historical figures and those outside the political
173. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
174. Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203 (1954).
175. Id. at 204 (citation omitted). Invasion of privacy was not a suitable cause of action for
a public figure because he was deemed to have waived this right.
176. Id.
177. See, e.g., Haelan Labs., 202 F.2d 866 (baseball cards); Brinkley v. Casablancas, 438
N.Y.S. 2d 1004 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (posters).
178. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (plaintiffs
"human cannonball" act was shown in its entirety).
179. Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc. 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (plaintiff come-
dian had announced his candidacy for president).
180. See Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Ct. App. 1983) (National En-
quirer's use of Clint Eastwood's name and photograph was a commercial exploitation not
entitled to First Amendment protection as the accompanying story was published with know-
-ing or reckless disregard for the truth).
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arena. " ' Under this theory, the former category would be granted
greater constitutional protection because "[p]ortrayals that are primarily
informative are often designated news.... Because these portrayals are
viewed as essential to the public debate, they are afforded the fullest First
Amendment protection."1 82 It is clear that the right of publicity evolved
to protect a celebrity's property interest from commercial exploitation
without consent and compensation. Therefore, the initial inquiry of
whether a docudrama is a commercial exploitation needs to be addressed.
2 Misapplying the Right of Publicity to Docudramas
In a strict sense, the broadcasting of a docudrama is not a commer-
cial use of a celebrity's name, likeness or voice, and such a use will not
severely impact on the commercial livelihood of the celebrity.' 83 It may
be argued, however, that the celebrity's name is being used to sell the
product (Le., the biographical docudrama), and the program may lack
newsworthiness. 84 A troublesome case in this area is Taylor v. American
Broadcasting Co.'85 Briefly, ABC was developing a docudrama based on
Taylor's life to be entitled The Elizabeth Taylor Story. Taylor promptly
filed suit seeking injunctive relief, claiming misappropriation and viola-
tion of her common law right of publicity.' 86 While the law is far from
clear on the issue of a celebrity's right of publicity in the docudrama
context, the suit itself was enough to terminate the project.' 87
In related cases in which the highest courts of California and New
York have ruled, the reasoning and analysis applied would lead to seem-
ingly conflicting results in the Taylor case.' 8' In the New York case,' 89
the court found that since the biography used "imaginary incidents, man-
ufactured dialogue, and attributed thoughts and feelings,"'" and the de-
181. Hansen, supra note 13, at 20.
182. Fetcher & Rubin, supra note 109, at 1597.
183. It may even be argued that such docudramas will increase celebrities' commercial
value by drawing attention to them and perhaps initiating new fans.
184. "Newsworthiness" is a difficult issue in the 1990s, as news itself is evolving into "in-
fotainment" and the line between news and entertainment becomes increasingly more gray. In
addition, the Supreme Court specifically decided not to distinguish between news and en-
tertainment when applying the First Amendment. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
185. No. 82 Civ. 6977 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
186. Taylor's complaint listed four causes of action: (1) misappropriation under New York
Civil Rights Law sections 50-51; (2) common law right of privacy violation; (3) trademark
confusion and damage to her protectible service marks and trade name under the Lanham Act;
and (4) unfair competition. Kovner, supra note 144, at 8. Only the right of publicity claims
will be discussed herein.
187. Sobel, supra note 4, at 4.
188. Id.
189. Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 233 N.E.2d 840 (N.Y. 1967), appeal dismissed, 393
U.S. 1046 (1969).
190. Id.
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fendants knew of the fictionalization, the publication violated the New
York statute.' 9 In contrast, the California Supreme Court, with Chief
Justice Bird writing for herself and three other justices, took a much
broader view of the scope of the First Amendment and the California
Constitution's guarantee of free speech.192 Chief Justice Bird wrote:
The right of publicity derived from public prominence does not confer
a shield .... Surely, the range of free expression would be meaning-
fully reduced if prominent persons in the present and recent past were
forbidden topics for the imaginations of authors of fiction. ... Valen-
tino was a Hollywood star. His life and career are part of the cultural
history of an era.... Whether the publication involved was factual
and biographical or fictional, the right of publicity has not been held to
outweigh the value of free expression. 193
The Taylor case, which would have provided a perfect opportunity
to test these opposing views, did not live up to its promise because ABC
settled the case.' 94 Suits (or threatened suits) of this sort can severely
impact the production of docudramas about living celebrities, both from
a monetary and creative standpoint. Docudrama producer Roger
Gimbel 95 commented on the creative implications of the Taylor suit:
"Such legal threats can be a severe dramatic drawback, since they make
it nearly impossible to produce anything but a flattering puff piece on a
living subject who has not consented to be portrayed."' 196 In addition,
First Amendment attorneys express concern over the chilling effect the
financial impact of such suits will have:
Prior restraint is a very heavy burden on freedom of expression.
Broadcasters have to build in the cost of litigation, so as celebrities
become more litigious, and file more suits to try to prevent dramas or
movies about them from being made, fewer people worth writing about
will be written about, and the public will lose a significant means of
being informed. 19
7
Aside from the serious implications of prior restraint, Taylor's complaint
has another major flaw. Taylor has argued that the value of her life story
would decrease if other versions were produced. 198 However, this is an
191. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1991).
192. Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454 (Cal. 1979) (affirmed dismissal of
right of publicity claim of Valentino's nephew, as right of publicity is not descendible). It
should be noted that this case was decided before the enactment of California Civil Code
section 990.
193. Id. at 460-63.
194. Because the case was filed in New York, perhaps it was the fear of an adverse judg-
ment that persuaded ABC to settle.
195. Credits include My Own Story, a 1981 docudrama about the life of Sophia Loren,
which the actress authorized and starred in (as herself and her mother).
196. Lewin, supra note 168, at 1 (quoting Roger Gimbel).
197. Id. at 19.
198. Deborah Manson, The Television Docudrama and the Right ofPublicity, 7 COMM. &
THE LAW 41 n.l (1985).
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unlikely consequence because television frequently broadcasts more than
one version of the same events,199 and it is hard to imagine a network
turning down the "authorized" version of Elizabeth Taylor's life.2 '
Logic then seems to lead to the conclusion that docudramas should
not be subject to right of publicity claims. When individuals choose to
make a profession out of being in the public eye, they lose a certain
amount of privacy and their personal lives become a matter of "public
interest." Whether it is an article in People Magazine or the National
Enquirer, or a television docudrama, celebrities should not be able to use
injunctive relief as a prior restraint to such publications. This would take
the law down a slippery slope which would severely impact First Amend-
ment rights and deprive the public of access to matters in which it is
interested. In addition, if the docudrama, once presented, is defamatory
or actionable for other reasons, then celebrities are able to seek redress in
the courts. Allowing it before the fact would be a grave mistake.
G. Copyright Infringement
Copyright infringement should not be overlooked when producing a
docudrama. Source material used by a writer will most likely be pro-
tected by copyright, since articles and books are original works fixed in a
tangible medium of expression.20 1 The Copyright Act2"2 grants the
owner of the copyright an exclusive right to reproduce and prepare deriv-
ative works based upon the copyrighted work.2"3 An infringement of
these rights is actionable under the Act.2°' With regard to a nonfiction
work, while the work itself is protected, the facts embodied in it are
not.205 The rationale is that the Act requires originality for copyright
protection, and facts are not considered to be original.20 6 Therefore,
199. See, e.g., The Royal Romance of Charles and Diana (CBS television broadcast, Sept.
20, 1982), and Charles and Diana: A Royal Love Story, supra note 29; Liberace, supra note 76,
and Liberace: Behind the Music, supra note 76; Nutcracker: Money, Madness and Murder,
supra note 31, and At Mother's Request (CBS television broadcast, Jan. 4 & 6, 1987).
200. See. e.g., Elvis & Me (ABC television broadcast, Feb. 7-8, 1988) (Priscilla Presley's
story of her life with Elvis) which was not preempted by prior Elvis telefilms Elvis, supra note
30, and Elvis & the Beauty Queen (NBC television broadcast, Mar. 1, 1981).
201. The United States Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1991) [hereinafter the
Act]: "Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of author-
ship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which
they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid
of a machine or device" (emphasis added).
202. Id. §§ 101.810.
203. Id. § 106. A docudrama is considered a derivative work.
204. Id. § 501(a).
205. M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.11[A] (1978).
206. Id. The opposite result would allow the first person who wrote about an event (pres-
ent or historical) to have a monopoly on its telling.
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"courts have denied copyright protection not only to historical facts, but
also to facts as set forth in biographical works, in news stories, and in
other forms of expression."2 "7 The potential liability for the docudrama
producer lies in the manner in which the writer copies from the source
material. Protection is afforded to the author's expression of the facts,
which includes the arrangement, selection, and patterning of the facts.
Therefore, if the author of the source material has a unique angle on the
story or an unusual style, the material may not be freely copied. In such
an instance, the producer may wish to purchase the rights to the work.2 °8
Copyright infringement actions against docudrama producers are most
likely to arise based on three theories of recovery: the author claims in-
fringement of his or her research; the author claims the docudrama is
substantially similar to his or her work; or the author claims the writer
appropriated too much of his or her work. Although to some extent the
claims overlap, they will be discussed separately below.
1. Facts and Research Are Not Protected
Writers have argued that their labor and efforts in researching a sub-
ject should be entitled to copyright protection. This argument was re-
jected by the Second Circuit in Rosemont Enterprises v. Random House,
Inc. 2o and by the Fifth Circuit in Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 2 0
In Rosemont, the plaintiff alleged that defendant's biography of Howard
Hughes utilized a great deal of the research presented in his articles on
Hughes published in Look Magazine. The court held this to be a legiti-
mate use, stating: "We... cannot subscribe to the view that an author is
absolutely precluded from saving time and effort by referring to and rely-
ing upon prior published material."2 1 One of the underlying purposes of
copyright law is to grant authors exclusive rights as motivation for the
creation and dissemination of information to the public. Therefore, if
one author builds upon another's work, it is seen as furthering this un-
derlying public interest.21 2 Relying in part on the Rosemont decision, the
Fifth Circuit in Miller also rejected the author's contention that his re-
search efforts should be protected by copyright. The author of 83 Hours
Till Dawn had spent an estimated 2500 hours researching his book based
on the sensational kidnapping of a Florida college student (the victim
served as a co-author) and claimed that the Universal Studios made-for-
207. Id.
208. Gerdes, supra note 14, at 56.
209. 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
210. 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981).
211. Rosemont, 366 F.2d at 310 (citations omitted).
212. Robert C. Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of
Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 516, 538 (1981).
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television movie, entitled The Longest Night, infringed the copyright to
the book. In reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals reasoned
that:
a fact does not originate with the author of a book describing the fact
.... The line drawn between uncopyrightable facts and copyrightable
expression of facts serves an important purpose in copyright law. It
provides a means of balancing the public's interest in stimulating crea-
tive activity, as embodied in the Copyright Clause, against the public's
need for unrestrained access to information.21 3
2. Scenes-a-Faire and Substantial Similarity
A more traditional copyright infringement claim may arise when the
plaintiff-author claims that the docudrama was based on his or her book.
In order to succeed on such a copyright infringement claim, the plaintiff
will have to prove that: (1) The defendant had access to the copyrighted
work, and (2) the defendant's work is substantially similar to plain-
tiff'S. 214 Access may be proven based on circumstantial evidence of a
"reasonable opportunity to view. "21- If the source material is "a famous,
widely-disseminated work," access may be presumed.216 Therefore, ac-
cess is not a major issue if the source material is a book or widely distrib-
uted periodical. The second issue, substantial similarity, is more likely to
be the triable element. More specifically, in a suit involving a nonfiction
work, the plaintiff would have to prove substantial similarity in the copy-
rightable elements of his or her work.
For example, Thomas Walker, a former New York City police of-
ficer, wrote a book entitled Fort Apache, based on his experiences in the
South Bronx's Forty-first Precinct. 217 Five years later, the defendant's
film, Fort Apache: The Bronx, which depicted the "same milieu" as the
plaintiff's book, was released.21 8 The plaintiff sued, alleging his book was
copied. Both stories revolved around the "violence and urban decay of
the Forty-first Precinct," and depicted prostitution, drug abuse, thefts,
murders, suicides, and other crimes.2" 9 The court held that these ele-
ments "would appear in any realistic work about the work of policemen
in the South Bronx. These similarities, therefore are unprotectible as
213. Miller, 650 F.2d at 1368-71. Ultimately, Miller's book was also used as the basis for a
docudrama, when the victim's story was retold in 83 Hours 'Til Dawn (CBS television broad-
cast, Nov. 11, 1990). Once more, this shows that although a particular story has been told on
television, it does not preempt future projects.
214. Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159
(1986).
215. NIMMER, supra note 205, § 13.02.
216. M. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 267 (1989).
217. The precinct had been nicknamed "Fort Apache" by police officers.
218. Walker, 784 F.2d at 46.
219. Id.
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scenes-a-faire, that is, scenes that necessarily result from the choice of
setting or situation.""22 Scenes-a-faire is a valuable defense in the
docudrama context when productions are "inspired by" real events,
rather than being "based upon" one specific event.
3. Fair Use
The Copyright Act limits authors' exclusive rights for "fair uses" of
the copyrighted work.22 This exception entitles others to use the copy-
righted work "for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting
.. . or research." '222 Once the plaintiff has proven copyright infringe-
ment, the defendant may raise fair use as a defense. The Act sets forth
four considerations when evaluating whether or not the defendant's use
is a fair use:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.223
The third and fourth factors will be the most critical in a docudrama
case. For example, in Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises,224
The Nation magazine was held to have infringed the copyright to Gerald
Ford's memoirs by publishing, verbatim, the most important 300 words
in his book.225 The Supreme Court agreed with the district court, which
found that this publication "took essentially the heart of the book,"
which exceeded a fair use.
In a recent Ninth Circuit decision, the court identified the "last fac-
tor [as] undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use."'226
The court affirmed summary judgment for the defendant, holding that
although the novelist copied from the plaintiff's historical work, the ma-
terial copied was primarily unprotectible research, and the financial im-
pact of the use, if any, was likely to be minuscule. Further, the court
stated that "[i]f an author of a novel used [plaintiff's] work and was hon-
220. Id. at 50.
221. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
225. Id. at 566. In addition, because The Nation was distributed before the book, the de-
fendant violated Ford's right of first publication.
226. Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 914 (9th Cir. 1989). See also NIMMER, supra note
205, § 13.05[A] (§ 107(4) is the most important consideration so as not to frustrate the consti-
tutional policy of encouraging creative effort through economic incentive).
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orable enough to acknowledge sources, such a use might enhance sales of
[the plaintiff's book].1 227
While it is unlikely that a docudrama would credit a source not
purchased, the same theory could be argued; that is, an increase in atten-
tion to the subject matter may lead to increased book sales and therefore
have a positive financial impact. Copyright infringement is perhaps one
of the easiest potential liabilities to prevent. The Act and case law com-
prehensively set forth the elements for infringement, and careful use of
source material can avoid all claims.
III
Potential Liabilities When Rights Are Secured
A. Introduction
To avoid many, if not all, of the liabilities discussed thus far, a pro-
ducer may wish to acquire rights228 in the story to be dramatized.
Although obtaining "releases 229 [is] one of the safest ways to prevent liti-
gation,"2 30 the legal inquiry does not end here. A new set of legal issues
arises which includes deciding from whom to acquire the rights and how
to structure the acquisition agreement for the rights. In some instances,
the nature of the story will dictate pursuit of the rights. For example, a
producer may benefit immeasurably from securing the subject's rights to
a story of personal triumph231 or a heroic rescue.232 If the docudrama
features a sensational crime233 or historical event,234 however, it may
prove more worthwhile to acquire rights of a journalist or criminal inves-
tigator. Once the producer has chosen which rights to pursue, legal and
financial considerations need to be addressed. This section of the article
227. Id.
228. The term "rights" is used in this section to mean life story rights (when contracting
with the parties portrayed) and literary rights (if a book, magazine story, or manuscript is
acquired).
229. In this context the release would relinquish the tort remedies detailed above (defama-
tion, invasion of privacy, right of publicity, etc.).
230. Gerdes, supra note 14, at 57.
231. See, e.g., The Ted Kennedy, Jr. Story, supra note 26; The Ryan White Story, supra note
8.
232. See, e.g., Everybody's Baby: The Rescue of Jessica McClure, supra note 7.
233. See, e.g., Missing. supra note 24 (rights to the book The Execution of Charles Hormon:
An American Sacrifice were acquired); Murder Ordained (CBS television broadcast, May 3 &
5, 1987) (story of minister who conspired with lover to murder their spouses; rights acquired
from two journalists and the police investigator); Nutcracker: Money, Madness and Murder,
supra note 31 (based on Shana Alexander's nonfiction account of how a New York socialite
manipulated her son into killing her rich but frugal father).
234. See, e.g., Kent State, supra note 9 (three books credited as underlying rights); All The
President's Men (Warner Brothers 1976) (Woodward & Bernstein's account of the Watergate
scandal).
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will discuss the creative, legal, and financial limitations present when ob-
taining rights and detail measures which should be taken to minimize the
risk of litigation.
B. Sources of the Rights
The primary sources of rights are the subject to be portrayed, jour-
nalists who have been involved in researching and reporting a particular
story or case, or police investigators. When dealing with a story which
focuses on an individual or family who is to be portrayed in a positive
light, the most logical choice is to go directly to the family. However, in
many instances a newsworthy event triggers a "feeding frenzy for
rights" '235 whereby the subject is deluged with offers from agents, studios,
or producers.236 As a result, several problems may emerge: subjects may
be reluctant to consent or demand inordinate sums of money, or only
partial rights may be available (additional rights may have been acquired
by another producer). While lack of exclusivity will not preclude a net-
work sale,237 acquiring all the rights is certainly an asset. If significant
rights are acquired by two parties, a co-production may be a beneficial
solution; the two companies pool their resources and have one stronger
package to sell to the networks (or other third party licensee). 23 8
Purchasing the rights to a journalist's research and personal obser-
vations is frequently selected when the docudrama is based on a crime or
where the subjects depicted would be unwilling to consent. Although a
story may be told from public domain sources, these rights provide the
producer with a "selling tool . . . your angle into the story . . . the
person who has given you insight. ' 239 An ideal illustration is All The
President's Men.2' The story of the Watergate scandal could have been
235. Clifford, supra note 59.
236. Eg., after Reverend Bird and his mistress were arrested for the murders of their
spouses, 36 producers originally scrambled for the rights and all three networks began develop-
ing the project.
237. See, e.g., At Mother's Request, supra note 199 and Nutcracker: Money, Madness and
Murder, supra note 31 (Frances Schreuder murder case; both versions based on journalist's
books); Washington: Behind Closed Doors, supra note 22, Blind Ambition (CBS television
broadcast, May 20-23, 1979), and All The President's Men, supra note 234 (three perspectives
on Watergate and the Nixon White House; all based on books); The Longest Night, supra note
20, and 83 Hours 'Til Dawn, supra note 213 (kidnapped heiress buried underground; versions
told 18 years apart; one version based on a book, the other public domain).
238. Eg., producer Zev Braun had obtained the rights of the police investigator in the
Reverend Bird case, and Interscope Communications secured the rights of two journalists.
The two entities then joined forces to sell the project to CBS, which aired it as Murder Or-
dained. Clifford, supra note 59.
239. Id. This applies equally to rights obtained from a police investigator, district attorney,
etc.
240. All the President's Men, supra note 234.
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told without Woodward and Bernstein, but their story of perseverance
and investigative expertise was an integral part of the scandal and subse-
quent film and made that version of Watergate the most valuable one at
the time.241 In most cases, however, the journalist would not be an inte-
gral part of the story, but a neutral observer who has researched and
compiled the events.242 As a practical matter, producers should be aware
that many experienced journalists will attempt to "attach" themselves to
the story. In order to obtain the subject's rights, the producer must in-
volve the journalist in the project as either a consultant or a writer. If a
producer can avoid the pitfall of having to hire the journalist as a writer
on the telefilm,243 employing him or her as a consultant can be
advantageous.
Two other limitations on securing rights warrant discussion. The
first is that the person sought to be portrayed may refuse to consent (rea-
sons may include that the portrayal will be negative, a monetary agree-
ment could not be reached or other contractual demands could not be
met). In such an instance, the project will not be abandoned, but the
producer will have to work around the character: "Either eliminate the
character altogether or disguise that character. Change their sex, age...
combine the person with others into one character so that no one person
can claim to be the one portrayed." 2" This action would provide a de-
fense to a defamation suit because the plaintiff would have difficulty ful-
filling the "of and concerning" requirement.245 In any event, the
insurance companies will influence whether the portrayal of a noncon-
241. Of course, at that time none of the players had written memoirs. When these addi-
tional versions were available, the unique perspectives provided by Erhlichman and Dean were
also valuable, and their marketability was not affected by All The President's Men. Purchasing
a book has legal advantages as well: copyright infringement litigation may be avoided since
the source material will have been purchased, and the publisher may indemnify the producer
or may have already acquired the requisite releases. Generally, a producer feels more legally
secure when acquiring a book. "It's very comforting to the networks if they can buy a major
book by a proven author from a reputable book publisher," observed the agent who sold Jo-
seph's Wambaugh's Echoes in the Darkness, based on the headline-making Philadelphia Main
Line murder conviction of a high school teacher, to CBS (quoted in Peter H. Brown, Murder
Most Glamorized, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1989, (Calendar), at 19). Courts have also found this to
be an important factor when considering whether a media defendant acted with reckless disre-
-gard for the truth. See, e.g., Davis v. Costa-Gavras, 654 F. Supp. 653, 656 (S.D.N.Y.. 1987),
where the court found it reasonable for Universal Studios not to have validated independently
the research for the film Missing because the book was nominated for a Pulitzer Prize and
published by a major publisher.
242. See, e.g., Shana Alexander (Nutcracker Money, Madness and Murder); Joe McGinnis
(Fatal Vision, Blind Faith).
243. The disadvantage is that many journalists will not be acceptable writers to the net-
work, and therefore such a commitment can either make a project unsalable, or cost the pro-
ducer the payment of the writing fee, which will not be reimbursed by the network.
244. Clifford, supra note 59.
245. See defamation discussion, supra notes 36-78 and accompanying text.
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senting party may be used at all.246 The second limitation arises when
the producer seeks to acquire life story rights directly from a criminal,
and a "Son of Sam" statute applies. What follows is a more detailed
examination of these statutes.
1. Son of Sam Limitations
Telefilms based on heinous or scandalous crimes have traditionally
been successful ventures. Recent telefilms such as Love, Lies and Mur-
der247 and I Know My First Name is Steven24 have performed extremely
well in the ratings.249 Nevertheless, acquiring life story rights for this
type of docudrama may be difficult because of the so-called "Son of Sam"
laws, whereby a criminal is barred from profiting from the sale of his or
her story. The original Son of Sam law was enacted after a news story
reported that a publisher was negotiating for the life story rights of mass
murderer David Berkowitz, 250 who was nicknamed the Son of Sam.2 51
Outraged by the pending lucrative deal (providing an advance of
$250,0O0),252 and "shocked by the large number of thrill seekers and by
the media trumpeting forth each little Berkowitz happening," the New
York legislature "hastened to debar Berkowitz and others from profiting
from their heinous misdeeds."'25 The result was the nation's first law
requiring that a criminal's proceeds from the sale of his of her life story
rights be placed in an escrow account for the benefit of the victims of his
or her crime.2 54 Since the New York law was enacted in 1982, more than
half of the states have adopted similar legislation.2 "- The underlying
246. See script clearances discussion, infra notes 351-63 and accompanying text.
247. See supra note 6.
248. See supra note 21.
249. Love, Lies and Murder placed second for the week with a 20.3 rating; I Know My First
Name is Steven achieved a 21.6 rating on May 22, 1989. THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, Feb-
ruary 27, 1991, at 1. See also Fatal Vision, supra note 5 (earned a 44 share); Billionaire Boys
Club, supra note 5 (earned a 35 share); Murder Ordained, supra note 233 (earned a 30 share).
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1989, at C19, C22. A "share" is the percentage of U.S. households tuned
into a particular program based on the total number of households viewing television at that
time. In contrast, a "rating" is the percentage of U.S. households tuned into a particular
program based on the total possible number of households with television, regardless of
whether the television was in use at the time of the telecast.
250. The contract was actually between the conservator of Berkowitz' estate and the pub-
lisher, as he had been declared incompetent.
251. New York City was terrorized for more than a year by Berkowitz' random shootings
that ultimately left six people dead and seven wounded.
252. The proceeds were to go to his defense attorneys.
253. Matter of Johnson, 430 N.Y.S.2d 904, 906 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
254. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1988) (funds were to be distributed to victims
who received civil judgments against the 'criminal).
255. It is interesting to note that the catalyst for many of the statutes was a particularly
notorious crime within the state. For example, Massachusetts enacted its statute after a for-
mer police captain convicted of armed robbery wrote The Cops Are Robbers; Hollywood's
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principle of these laws certainly seems justified--criminals should not
profit from their crimes, and if possible, victims should be
compensated.23 6
Although many publishers and legal commentators criticize the
statutes for violating the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech,
the Son of Sam laws have withstood a number of constitutional chal-
lenges. 257 However, last December, in a unanimous 8-0 decision, the
United States Supreme Court declared New York's Son of Sam law un-
constitutional. 25s The Court focused primarily on two issues: (1) that
the statute violated the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech inas-
much as the statute "singled out speech on a particular subject for a
financial burden that it places on no other speech and no other in-
come";259 and (2) that the statute is overinclusive in that it applies not
only to those convicted of crimes, but also to "anyperson who has volun-
tarily and intelligently admitted the commission of a crime for which such
person is not prosecuted.' ' 260 The Court determined that such content-
based discrimination was inconsistent with the protection of the First
Amendment, and, while the state had an interest in compensating vic-
tims from the proceeds of the crime, the statute was not "narrowly tai-
lored" enough to overcome the burden placed on First Amendment
rights. 261 As to the impact on the constitutionality of other Son of Sam
statutes, the Court declared that it has "no occasion to determine the
constitutionality of these other laws" at this time and concluded with a
very narrow holding.2 62 Therefore, while the Court clearly has left New
interest in the Reverend Bird story prompted Kansas to adopt a Son of Sam law; Virginia
passed a statute after a convicted mass murderer published his autobiography; California pro-
posed such a bill in 1978 but it was abandoned-five years later the so-called "Dan White" law
was enacted, named for the man who murdered San Francisco Mayor Moscone and Supervisor
Milk. Sue S. Okuda, Note, Criminal Anti-profit Laws: Some Thoughts in Favor of Their Con-
stitutionality, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1355, n.14 (1988).
256. This underlying policy reason allowed Sydney Biddle Barrows to keep the proceeds
from her book, Mayflower Madam: The Secret Life of Sydney Biddle Barrows, and the subse-
quent telefilm, Mayflower Madam, supra note 28 (descendant of Mayflower pioneers convicted
of running an upscale prostitution service). The court held that she committed a "victimless"
crime and therefore proceeds could not be attached. RONALD L. GOLDFARB & GAIL E. Ross,
THE WRITER'S LAWYER 22 (1989).
257. See Matter of Johnson, 430 N.Y.S.2d 904 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
258. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct.
501 (1991).
259. Id. at 503.
260. Id. at 505 (citing N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-1(10)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1991)).
261. Id at 511-12. The Court cited works such as The Autobiography of Malcolm X and
Thoreau's Civil Obedience as examples of publications from which the authors would not be
entitled to profit under New York's statute because of the discussions involving crimes the
authors had committed. The Court reasoned that the possibility of erroneous, unbalanced
outcomes such as these required that the statute be stricken as overinclusive.
262. Id. at 512.
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York without its Son of Sam statute, it has cautioned against assuming
that other such statutes are also unconstitutional.2 63
As a result, before proceeding with the purchase of life story rights
from one who may be accused or convicted of a crime (or any other party
who may fall within the subject class in the applicable statute), a pro-
ducer must first determine whether a Son of Sam statute applies. The
producer must look to the laws of the state where the crime was commit-
ted. The statutes will vary in the types of crimes2 64 and parties cov-
ered. 263  A potential problem arises if the criminal was on a "crime
spree" which proceeded through more than one state, in which case more
than one statute may apply. In addition, if the criminal has committed
the crime against the United States, Congress has enacted its own version
of the Son of Sam law, entitled the Victims Crime Act of 1984.266 While
the state and federal statutes do not prohibit life story acquisition agree-
ments with criminals, the convicted felon may have little motivation to
make a deal if he or she cannot reap any of the financial rewards. Some
producers have tried to work around these restrictions by obtaining
rights from relatives or an intermediary. 267 This is ill-advised as the stat-
ute may be broadly constructed,268 or expansively interpreted by the
263. Even though the United States Supreme Court declared that New York's Son of Sam
statute was unconstitutional, similar statutes in other states would still be valid until the gov-
erning state courts declared the statutes unconstitutional or the state legislatures repealed
them.
264. Some statutes cover only violent crimes, while others affect all crimes that have vic-
tims. The laws have not yet reached proceeds from white collar criminals; however, opponents
of these laws express great concern over this possibility. It is argued that if, for example, John
Dean (Blind Ambition) and John Ehrlichman (Washington: Behind Closed Doors) were unable
to profit from their autobiographies, the public would be deprived of an important part of our
nation's history. It is also argued that "i]nside information supplied by a criminal not only
provides the important elements of a 'good story' that the public will enjoy reading [or seeing],
but also can reveal insights useful to future law enforcement efforts. Often it is an important
tool in fighting crime to fully understand how and why a crime has been committed." GOLD-
FARB & Ross, supra note 256, at 20.
265. Under the New Jersey statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:4B-27, 52:4B-33 (West 1986),
publishers and authors are entitled to their fees and profits, and legal expenses for the criminal
may also be paid out of life story rights proceeds.
266. Victims Crime Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3671-3672 (1992). For a detailed substantive dis-
cussion of this statute, see Casenote, Victims' Compensation: Congress Acts to Make Sure That
Crime Doesn't Pay-Sometimes, 7 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 201 (1987).
267. Okuda, supra note 255, at 1373.
268. Skirting the statute is not always feasible. For example, the New Jersey statute explic-
itly covers every person with whom a producer may try to contract: "[E]very contract with a
person convicted or accused of a crime in this State or an agent, beneficiary, conservator,
executor, guardian, representative, relative, friend, associate or conspirator of a person con-
victed or accused of a crime in this State, with respect to the reenactment of the crime..." is
subject to the law. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-26.
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courts. 2 6 9 For example, Joe McGinnis, the author of Fatal Vision, con-
tracted with Dr. Jeffrey MacDonald for his life story rights, and Mac-
Donald was to receive forty percent of the proceeds from any sale of the
rights for television or film. 270 Even though the network and production
company did not contract directly with MacDonald, these proceeds are
considered to be within the scope of the California statute.271 When the
producer does contract with a third party, additional complications may
arise if the court later determines that the Crime Victims Board, or simi-
lar body, is entitled to the proceeds paid to that party. If the third party
no longer has the money received, the producer or network would be
responsible for paying to the Crime Victims Board, or similar body, an
amount equal to the sum paid to that person (e.g., monies would have to
be paid twice). Aside from the practical difficulties in contracting with a
convicted felon, there are ethical considerations as well. Patricia Clif-
ford, producer of Murder Ordained, aptly stated: "We would never give
a convicted felon anything. . . .If they're in jail, they're in jail for a
reason.... The money is saved, in my opinion, for people who helped the
victims."272
C. Necessary Provisions in Acquisition Agreements 273
Once the producer ("Purchaser")2 74 has decided from whom to ob-
tain the rights, the most important task lies ahead-drafting an agree-
ment which affords the Purchaser the greatest possible protection but
which the rights holder ("Owner")2 75 will still sign. Negotiating the
terms of a rights acquisition agreement requires a delicate balance be-
tween assuring the Owner that he or she has nothing to fear (i e., that the
portrayal will be one which they will approve), protecting the interests of
the Purchaser against future litigation, and allowing the Purchaser the
creative freedom necessary to produce an exciting, interesting, and suc-
269. See Matter of Johnson, 904 N.Y.S.2d 904 (Sup. Ct. 1979) ("Any action taken by any
person accused or convicted of a crime... to defeat the purpose of this section shall be null
and void as against public policy."). Another notable example can be found in Jean Harris,
convicted murderer of Scarsdale Diet czar Dr. Herman Tarnower, who was ordered to repay
money derived from her book even though the funds were given to charity.
270. MacDonald, the former green beret, was convicted of murdering his wife and two
daughters. Okuda, supra note 255, at 1374 n.136.
271. Id.
272. Clifford, supra note 59.
273. The following discussion will detail only those provisions specifically relevant to
avoiding liability when acquiring life story rights.
274. The term "Purchaser" will be used in this subsection to refer to the person or com-
pany who is purchasing the rights.
275. The term "Owner" will be used in this subsection to refer to the person granting the
rights, whether the individual is the subject of the life story or a third party (e.g., journalist,
police detective, etc.).
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cessful docudrama. Standard contract terms in life story acquisition
agreements include the following: Exclusivity; Definition of the Prop-
erty; Rights Granted; Depiction Release and Waiver; Cooperation of the
Owner in obtaining documents and releases; Representations and War-
ranties; and Public Domain Protections." 6 In addition, provisions that
are not standard but may be negotiated include the following: Consult-
ant Services; Creative Control; Rights Reserved; and Frozen Rights,
Holdback Periods, Right of First Negotiation, and Right of Last Refusal.
Each of these provisions will be examined in detail.
1. Exclusivity
A rather obvious condition in the agreement is that the rights
granted be exclusive. There are two types of exclusivity the Purchaser
will seek: the rights granted should include all exploitation rights, and
the grant should cover the entire scope of the Owner's life story. With
regard to the former, this term is usually expressed in the opening para-
graph of a contract in language such as this ("Para. A"):
The following will confirm the terms and conditions of the agreement
("Agreement") between (name of Owner) ("Owner") and (name of
Purchaser) ("Purchaser") with respect to Purchaser's exclusive, irrevo-
cable option, and, if exercised by Purchaser, the purchase of all motion
picture, television, and allied rights in and to the Property as set forth
and defined in paragraph 1. hereinbelow (the "Property"). 277
The latter type of exclusivity is expressed in the definition of property,
discussed in detail below.
2. Property Defined2 78
The Property may be defined either in one brief sentence in the
opening paragraph or in a more detailed paragraph contained in the body
of the agreement. The former method would be reflected as follows: "As
set forth and defined . . ." in Para. A would be replaced with a brief
description of the story purchased. For example, if the docudrama was
to depict the Owner's personal triumph over physical disabilities caused
by a car accident, the replacement clause may be as follows: "which
shall include Owner's life story, specifically including but not limited to
the events and incidents surrounding Owner's car accident and subse-
quent struggle to recover and situations resulting therefrom (the 'Prop-
276. Other standard provisions such as option periods and fees, purchase price, and profit
participation will not be discussed herein as they do not particularly differ in this context.
277. Major studio life story acquisition agreement [hereinafter Studio Agreement]. The
Studio Agreement is not specifically identified for reasons of confidentiality. The rights
granted are specifically delineated in several provisions, infra notes 288-310 and accompanying
text.
278. The term "Property" will be used in this subsection to refer to the rights acquired.
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erty')." In contrast, the latter approach would include a broader
description of the rights granted such as the following:
The term "Property" as used herein, includes, but is not limited to, the
unconditional and exclusive right throughout the world to use, simu-
late and portray Owner's name, likeness, voice, personality and, to the
extent that Owner is in a position to grant such exclusive rights, per-
sonal experiences, incidents, situations and events which have hereto-
fore occurred (in whole or in part) based upon or taken from Owner's
life and activities as (brief description of story).27 9
Several factors should be considered when choosing which form to use.
It is in the Purchaser's best interest to use the broadest possible language
and cover the greatest spectrum of the Owner's rights,28 ° whereas the
Owner may wish to sell only a certain period of his or her life or only
that portion of his or her life relating to a particular event. 281 Another
consideration is the potential marketplace for the Property. If there was
only one event of national interest in the Owner's life, it may be unneces-
sary to acquire broad rights, 28 2 but if the Owner has led a varied and
fruitful life, or is a celebrity, more expansive rights are desirable, though
not always attainable.28 3 If the Purchaser is faced with such a restriction
on the rights granted, he or she may wish to insist on a "freeze" of that
portion of the Owner's rights not granted and a subsequent "holdback
period" with regard to such rights.284
3. Grant of Rights
This provision is perhaps the most important in a life story acquisi-
tion agreement. The Grant of Rights must cover all uses of the Property,
279. Studio Agreement, supra note 277. In the event that Owner has written literary mate-
rial based on the Property, the following additional language would be added: "and any right,
title and interest that Owner may have in that certain (treatment/article/story/book) entitled
(title of literary property) written by Owner which is based on the Property."
280. For example, rather than a specific description as previously detailed, the following
may be used: "with respect to the story of Owner's life, including all events and incidents
therein and all literary or other material based thereon."
281. D. FARBER, ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY CoNTRACTs § 63-2 (1990).
282. For example, HBO recently acquired the rights to Paul Solomon's life story. Solo-
mon's former lover is accused of killing his wife in what has been dubbed the "Fatal Attrac-
tion" murder trial. L.A. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1991, at El. It is interesting to note that Solomon's
deal included an option fee of $15,000, and a purchase price of $150,000, if the film was made.
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 25, 1991, at 57. These types of deals present an ethical dilemma because it
is in Solomon's best interest to get a conviction, and he is a key witness in the trial. On April
27, 1991, a mistrial was declared as the jury was deadlocked 8-4, favoring conviction. Channel
4 News: Nightside (KNBC television broadcast, Apr. 27, 1991).
283. For example, Interscope just acquired five years of someone's life because the Owner
refused to sell more and they felt that the events during that time could warrant a separate
telefilm. Clifford, supra note 59.
284. See discussion on frozen rights, holdback periods, right of first negotiation and right
of last refusal, infra notes 343-45 and accompanying text. These provisions are also appropri-
ate to cover exploitation rights which are reserved.
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as well as providing for expansive rights with regard to the depiction of
the Owner.285 Donald Farber drafted the following model (italicized
words have been added to supplement Farber's model):2 6
Owner does hereby exclusively sell, grant, convey, transfer, set over
and assign to Purchaser, Purchaser's successors, licensees and assigns
all rights in and to [Property],28 7 including, but not limited to the
following:
(a) Production and Distribution: The sole and exclusive right to make
television programs and motion picture versions or adaptations of the
[Property] or any part thereof, and to produce one or more motion
pictures of any type based upon or adapted in whole or in part from
the [Property], 2  or any part thereof, or any such versions or adapta-
tions (all of such programs, motion pictures, versions or adaptations
thereof hereinafter referred to as "motion picture versions"), 28s and to
produce, remake, distribute, exhibit, broadcast, perform, sell, license
for exhibition, exploit, dispose of and generally deal in any other man-
ner with one or more motion picture versions, in perpetuity, in all lan-
guages, in any and all media throughout the universe, whether now
known or hereafter devised. Included among such exclusive rights (but
not by way of limitation) are remake, sequel, prequel and spin-off rights,
all merchandising rights in and to the [Property] (including elements
thereof), all rights in and to the title, music, soundtrack album rights
and publication rights. 21
(b) Adaptation and Fictionalization: The sole and exclusive rights to
translate into all languages, and to freely adapt, revise, rearrange, add
to and subtract from the [Property], or any part thereof, and the title,
theme, plot, sequences, incidents, and characterizations thereof, to
make prequels and sequels to and new versions or adaptations of the
[Property] or any part thereof, to make serials of the [Property] or any
part thereof, to use any part or parts of the Property or of the theme
thereof or any incidents, characters, character names, scenes and se-
quences therein contained in conjunction with any other material or
materials, and to separately or cumulatively do any or all of the forego-
ing, to such extent as Purchaser in Purchaser's sole discretion may
deem expedient or desirable in the exercise of any of the rights, licenses
or privileges herein conveyed.291 Purchaser has the right to fictional-
ize, dramatize, simulate, portray and/or impersonate Owner's name,
285. While the provision does contain some language regarding the depiction of the Owner,
obtaining a separate depiction release and waiver is also advised.
286. FARBER, supra note 281, § 63-14 to 63-16.
287. Farber uses the term "Material" rather than "Property"; however, the term "Prop-
erty" has been substituted herein for consistency within this article.
288. The Owner may wish to limit the number of productions, or length (or require addi-
tional compensation for each such additional use or longer production), which would be ex-
pressed or referred to here.
289. The term "Projects" may be more suitable than "motion picture version" as it does
not create a specific idea in the Owner's mind (e.g., that a motion picture will be produced).
290. In many situations an Owner will want to reserve certain rights, such as publication
rights. The rights reserved should be referenced here, and another provision should set forth
the terms and conditions affecting such reserved rights.
291. If the agreement contains a Creative Control provision it should be referenced here.
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likeness, characterization, portrait, picture, voice, recording, and biog-
raphy in the motion picture versions, and to make use of incidents
which have occurred in relation to the Property, factually and/or fic-
tionally, and Purchaser may employ any actor of Purchaser's choosing
to portray Owner who may or may not resemble Owner, in Purchaser's
(or Purchaser's representative's) sole discretion.2 92
In connection with the provisions of this subparagraph (b), Owner agrees
to execute Purchaser's standard depiction release, which is attached
hereto as Exhibit "A " 293
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Clause l(b) to the con-
trary, it is Purchaser's intention to portray Owner's story as factually
as possible with the understanding that Purchaser has the right to devi-
ate from the facts in order to enhance the dramatic value of the
[Property].2 94
(c) Copyright: The sole and exclusive right to secure copyright regis-
tration (or equivalent protection in countries where no copyright law
exists) of such motion picture versions, and any other versions or adap-
tations (including but not limited to videocassettes, videodiscs, and all
other modes of exploitation whether now known or hereafter devised) of
[Property] herein elsewhere mentioned, and any sound records, sound-
tracks, or recordings in connection therewith, in all countries of the
universe295 under any now existing or hereafter created laws, regula-
tions or rules, in the name of the Purchaser or any other person, firm
or corporation. Purchaser shall be deemed to have acquired and is
hereby granted and assigned all rights in the [Property] under any
copyright which may have been herein granted, sold, assigned and set
over to Purchaser. If requested by Purchaser, Owner agrees to exe-
cute, acknowledge and deliver, or cause to be executed, acknowledged
and delivered to Purchaser, any instruments that may be required by
Purchaser or that may be necessary, proper or expedient in the opinion
of Purchaser to establish and vest in Purchaser such rights under such
copyright.
(d) Publicity and Advertising: Purchaser shall have the customary
right for advertising and publicity purposes to broadcast, prepare, pub-
lish and copyright publications in newspapers, magazines and periodi-
292. If applicable to the story acquired, the term "Owner's" in this paragraph should be
changed to include "Owner's and Owner's immediate family members'." In addition, if the
Owner requires that certain incidents or facts about his or her life be excluded, they may be
specifically delineated here.
293. Many agreements also contain a separate Depiction Release, which is discussed in
detail, infra notes 311-30 and accompanying text.
294. This provision may be reassuring to the Owner and does not limit the Purchaser's
rights. It may be an appropriate compromise if the Owner is insisting on some sort of creative
control or approval. Another way to appease an Owner's concerns over his or her portrayal is
to employ the Owner as a consultant. See discussion infra notes 335-42 and accompanying
text.
295. Recent contracts use "universe" to replace "world" as technologies and exploration
are rapidly expanding.
1992] DOCUDRAMAS
cals of all types, of any synopses, excerpts, summaries, and stories (all
which shall collectively be referred to as "synopses" herein and may
not exceed 2,500 words)2 9 6 of the [Property] and/or motion picture
versions or any part thereof, and the right to use said synopses in pos-
ters, lobby displays, pressbooks, trade publications, newspapers,
magazines and other periodicals, and all other media of advertising
and publicity whatsoever whether now known or hereafter devised (and
to copyright said synopses in Purchaser's name in all countries and
languages of the universe).
The foregoing rights, licenses, privileges and properties shall be en-
joyed by Purchaser throughout the universe, and the enumeration
thereof shall not be deemed to restrict or limit in any way the general-
ity of the grant made in this clause.
Nothing herein contained shall be interpreted or construed to obligate
Purchaser to produce any motion picture version of the [Property], or
exercise any of the rights, licenses or privileges herein conveyed.2 7
Paragraph (a), which sets forth the Production and Distribution
rights acquired, should be drafted as broadly as possible. Courts will
interpret broad, expansive language as granting all imaginable rights to
the Purchaser, except those rights which are specifically reserved by the
Owner. For example, in Platinum Record Co. v. Lucasfilm Ltd.,298 the
plaintiffs sued to recover damages for the distribution of the film Ameri-
can Graffiti on videocassettes. The plaintiffs argued that when they sold
the rights to several songs for the use in the soundtrack for the film, the
parties had not contemplated videocassettes, and therefore the grant did
not cover that means of exploitation. In rejecting this theory, the court
cited the provision of the contract which granted the right "to exhibit,
exploit, market and perform [American Graffiti] ... perpetually through-
out the world by any means or methods now or hereafter known. 2 99 The
court interpreted the broad language to favor the Purchaser, concluding
that "if the words are broad enough to cover the new use, it seems fairer
that the burden of framing and negotiating an exception should fall on
the grantor.""
Similarly, this analysis has been applied to the scope of the Adapta-
tion and Fictionalization rights granted pursuant to paragraph (b) in the
model. An illustrative case is Burnett v. Warner Bros. Pictures,3"' in
296. In his comments, Farber notes that "the number of words permitted to be used in
synopses may be as little as 1,000 or as much as 7,500." FARBER, supra note 281, § 63-16,
comment l(d).
297. This last paragraph is often set aside as a separate provision under the heading "No
Obligation to Exploit."
298. 566 F. Supp. 226 (D.N.J. 1983).
299. Id. at 227 (emphasis added).
300. Id.
301. 493 N.Y.S.2d 326 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
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which the playwrights of Everyone Comes to Rick's, the underlying work
for the film classic Casablanca,"2 attempted to limit Warner Brothers'
use of their characters in a subsequent television series.3"a The case was
dismissed for failure to state a cause of action because the contract con-
tained very broad language granting the Purchaser "all now or hereafter
existing rights of every kind... [and Owner further grants] the absolute
and unqualified right to use said work in whole or in part, in whatever
manner said purchaser may desire . . . ." The court held that "it is
beyond question that plaintiffs failed to retain any rights .... The assign-
ment of rights agreement contains no clauses specifically enumerating
any rights excluded to Warner Brothers. Rather, it contains only general
clauses assigning all imaginable rights to defendant Warner Brothers. ' 30 5
In contrast, if there is a reservation of rights clause which is open to
interpretation, the purchaser may be held liable for costly damages for
later uses. For example, Peggy Lee was granted summary judgment
against the Walt Disney Studios in her suit for a percentage of videocas-
sette sales .3' Lee alleged that her contract for the animated classic Lady
and the Tramp granted her the right to receive payments from all
"records and transcriptions" containing the soundtrack, and videocasset-
tes fell within the definition of "transcription." In 1952, when the con-
tract was drafted, neither Lee nor Disney had considered videocassette
distribution. The court, however, held that the term transcription "im-
plicitly included the sale of videocassettes. '3 0 7
Therefore, the language used to acquire the rights should be as ex-
pansive as possible. In the event the Owner does negotiate the right to
reserve certain rights in the Property, those rights should be carefully
and specifically delineated and defined. In addition, the Purchaser may
receive added protection by including a phrase such as "all rights not
specifically reserved by the Owner herein shall be deemed granted to the
Purchaser."
Farber structured his model life-story acquisition agreement in two
parts: an option agreement and the purchase agreement attached to it as
Exhibit A; the Rights Granted provisions detailed above were included
in his model Purchase Agreement. The following clause, from his model
Option Agreement, is also worth reviewing:
302. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (1942).
303. Ironically, the series only lasted four weeks, April 10 to May 7, 1983-much shorter
than the lawsuit.
304. 493 N.Y.S.2d at 327.
305. Id. at 327-28.
306. L.A. DAILY J., Apr. 2, 1990, at 1.
307. Id.
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Owner acknowledges that if Purchaser exercises the option, Purchaser
shall have the rights, in addition to the other rights granted in the
Purchase Agreement, in connection with any such Product 30 8 to use
any information, documents, news reports, clippings, photographs, re-
cordings and other materials dealing with, depicting or concerning
Owner and the [Property] whether furnished by Owner, others, or in
the public domain. 31 Purchaser shall have the right to include or
cause to be included in any such Product such actual or fictional
events, scenes, situations, dialogue and other materials as Purchaser
may consider desirable or necessary in Purchaser's sole and absolute
discretion. 31
0
Although the provisions above are complete and exhaustive, a separate
Depiction Release may also be desirable. In addition, all living people
portrayed in the docudrama should execute such a Depiction Release.
4. Depiction Releases and Waivers
If the producer contracts with the parties being portrayed, a Depic-
tion Release or Waiver may provide complete protection against tort lia-
bility. In essence, the Waiver grants the Purchaser immunity against
future suits by the Owner for defamation, invasion of privacy, right of
publicity, etc.,311 and the Depiction Release grants the Purchaser wide
latitude in presenting the Owner and the Owner's story.a 2
The legal protection afforded by a Waiver is complete if it is well
drafted and understood by the Owner. In Royer v. Steinberg, 313 the court
held that consent to publication of defamatory material is an absolute
308. "Product" is defined as: "Each such means of exploitation based on the Property is
hereinafter referred to as a 'Product.'" FARBER, supra note 281, § 63-2.
309. In many instances, the Owner will not actually have any rights in the materials de-
scribed. Therefore, a copyright analysis regarding the use of these materials is still necessary
to assure that the teleplay/screenplay writer has not violated any copyrights.
310. FARBER, supra note 281, § 63-5 to 63-6.
311. Farber drafted the following provision:
Owner hereby waives and relinquishes any rights or remedies at law, in equity or
otherwise, and further releases Purchaser and Purchaser's employees, agents, succes-
sors, licensees and assigns from, and covenants not to sue Purchaser, or any of them,
with respect to any claim, cause of action, liability or damage of any nature whatso-
ever arising out of or in connection with the exercise of any of the rights herein
granted to Purchaser or granted pursuant to the Purchase Agreement. Such liabili-
ties include without limitation defamation, libel, slander or invasion of any right of
privacy or publicity in any jurisdiction. The aforesaid waivers are hereby made by
Owner, both on Owner's own behalf and on behalf of Owner's next of kin.
Id. §§ 63-6 to 63-7.
312. In this discussion the terms Waiver and Depiction Release may be used interchangea-
bly as the two provisions are often presented in one contract clause and not distinguished.
313. 153 Cal. Rptr. 499 (Ct. App. 1979).
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defense.314 The court relied in part on the following section from Re-
statement (Second) of Torts:
The privilege conferred by the consent of the person about whom the
defamatory matter is published is absolute. The protection given by it
is complete, and it is not affected by the ill will or personal hostility of
the publisher or by any improper purpose for which he may make the
publication, unless the consent is to its publication for a particular pur-
pose, in which case the publication for any other purpose is not within
the scope of the consent. 315
This rule has also been adopted in several other jurisdictions.316
The critical element in this analysis is that the Waiver and/or De-
piction Release must be carefully drafted to expressly waive the various
torts. A notable case which may be applied to the docudrama context is
Kelly v. William Morrow & Co, 3 7 in which the issue was whether the
plaintiff waived the right to sue for defamation by consenting to depic-
tion in a novel. The trial court found, as a matter of law, that the waiver
was an absolute defense. The appellate court, however, reversed and re-
manded on the issue because the language of the actual waiver signed
was ambiguous. Therefore, the court could not conclude as a matter of
law that the waiver could be considered a "license to defame. ' a3 1  Specifi-
cally, the plaintiff consented to have Wambaugh portray him in his
novel; however, he did not explicitly waive any tort remedies. In the
relevant language of the waiver, the plaintiff gave the defendants the
rights to "use, simulate and portray my likeness, activities, experiences
and career... [and] to depict and/or portray me and such other persons
to such extent and in such manner, either factually or fictionally ... a"I9
The court held that with a contractual waiver such as this, it must be
clear that the person agreeing to the portrayal understands the rights
which are being waived. The lesson from Kelly is clear. The areas of
potential liability must be explicitly waived in order assure the validity of
the waiver.320
314. In a published letter, Royer, a school superintendent, challenged the school board to
substantiate his demotion. The court held that he thereby consented to a published response,
even a defamatory one.
315. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 583 cmt. f (1987).
316. See, e.g., Ernst v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 475 N.E.2d 351 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); Merritt
v. Detroit Memorial Hosp., 265 N.W.2d 124 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).
317. 231 Cal. Rptr. 497 (Ct. App. 1986) (Joseph Wambaugh obtained a release from a
border patrol officer to be depicted in his novel Lines and Shadows. Wambaugh used the
officer's real name and occupation, but fictionalized much of his characteristics, painting him
as "lecherous, heavy drinking, promiscuous, unfaithful and untruthful to his wife, loud, rau-
cous, blasphemous, profane, acting as a pimp for his fellow officers, and vacuous." Id. at 499.).
318. Id. at 502.
319. Id. at 500.
320. The Kelly case was settled before being decided on remand, and therefore the issue of
whether ambiguous language will suffice was not ruled upon. However, the line of cases indi-
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One requirement for obtaining Errors and Omissions Insurance (a
requirement of networks),321 is the acquisition of Depiction Releases
from all living people recognizably portrayed in the docudrama.322 This
can become an extremely costly and difficult task. For example, for the
docudrama Kent State the producer was required to obtain Depiction
Releases from eighty-five living people,323 and for the telefilm Every-
body's Baby: The Rescue of Jessica McClure, Interscope Communica-
tions acquired twenty-four Depiction Releases.324 In recent years, the
cost of obtaining releases has escalated dramatically. 325 As a result, sev-
eral problems may emerge. In the past, individuals aside from the major
characters granted Depiction Releases for a nominal fee, if any, but to-
day people are more aware that their portrayal has value and are more
likely to demand large sums of money.326 In some instances, the cost of
securing the additional releases may affect the creative process by dictat-
ing which actual people can be depicted.
A long-form Depiction Release should be obtained from the major
characters other than the central characters (e.g., immediate family
members).327 The example below is used both as an attachment to the
acquisition agreement for the Owner and as a separate Depiction Release
for other major characters. Although many of the rights provided for in
this provision duplicate clauses in the body of the acquisition agreement,
this separate release may be of additional value because it summarizes, in
one place, all the rights regarding the depiction and provides further con-
cates that a knowing consent is sufficient, and therefore having the potential causes of action
specifically delineated should provide complete protection. As stated above, even in the most
malicious of cases, the Restatement (Second) of Torts states that the ill will of the publisher is
not an issue.
321. See errors and omissions insurance discussion, infra at notes 351-63 and accompany-
ing text.
322. Clifford, supra note 59.
323. Brown, supra note 241.
324. Clifford, supra note 59.
325. For example, in 1980, NBC obtained all the necessary rights for Murder in Texas
(violent death of socialite Joan Hill) for $60,000. In 1988, CBS and Zev Braun paid $300,000
for the rights to nine police officers and district attorneys who solved the Mormon Murders
(Mark Hoffman, who killed to protect his career as a forger of church documents). Joe Mc-
Ginnis contracted for more than $400,000 for his book Blind Faith (insurance executive who
murdered his socially prominent wife) and Vincent Bugliosi received a record-breaking $1.1
million for his book And the Sea Will Tell, which at the time of the deal had not yet been
written. Brown, supra note 241.
326. Id. The officers and D.A.s from the Mormon murders case banded together and hired
one attorney who presented the rights package as an all or nothing deal.
327. Although the Depiction Releases obtained from minor characters are much shorter, it
is still crucial to obtain the rights to depict the individual factually and/or fictionally, to ac-
quire broad distribution rights in the portrayal, and to obtain the waiver of tort remedies.
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firmation of the rights granted. The language used for the Depiction Re-
lease for the Owner or additional persons is as follows:
The following will constitute the Agreement ("Depiction Release") be-
tween (name of Purchaser) ("Purchaser") and yourself, (sometimes re-
ferred to herein as "depicted person" or "undersigned"), relating to
your involvement in the project entitled (name of project) (the
"Project").
1. For good and valuable consideration given to the undersigned by
Purchaser pursuant to that certain agreement dated as of (date of
purchase agreement), 32 the adequacy and receipt of which is hereby
acknowledged, the undersigned, (name of depicted person), hereby ex-
pressly agrees and consents to Purchaser exclusively acquiring all mo-
tion picture, television, media and allied rights in and to the
undersigned's name, likeness, voice, personality, biography and the
right to depict and portray the undersigned in connection with any
television or theatrical motion picture based on (Owner's life story
and/or literary material acquired) entitled ("name of underlying liter-
ary property"). Purchaser will also have the right to produce and ex-
hibit remakes, prequels and sequels and to engage in related publicity
and exploitation with respect to all television and theatrical motion
picture uses related to this Project. Purchaser may also make a "be-
hind-the-scenes" documentary-type fim or videotape of varying
length, showing how the Project was filmed or produced. Such be-
hind-the-scenes production may be utilized by Purchaser to promote
the Project and may be presented as a separate commercial program
which can be telecast and/or exhibited for publicity and promotion
purposes on television and/or for use for theatrical trailers. Purchaser
shall have the express right to fictionalize the facts relating to the un-
dersigned's involvement in the Project, as well as the undersigned's
other activities connected with the Project. Purchaser will also have
the right to fictionalize the facts relating to various incidents in the
undersigned's life and will have the right to use a fictitious name to
represent the undersigned's life portrayed in any film or television pro-
gram based on the [Property], and/or in connection with any other
exploitation of said life story, including without limitation, publicity.
The undersigned is aware of the need to create the necessary suspense,
excitement and continuity for a commercial motion picture (whether
theatrical or television) and that certain dramatic license may need to
be taken in depicting the undersigned and the incidents from the un-
dersigned's life in such a presentation. Accordingly, the undersigned
consents to Purchaser's discretionary exercise of such "dramatic li-
cense" for the project for television or theatrical motion picture pur-
poses and agrees to bring no claim or action against Purchaser on any
related legal premise (including defamation, invasion of privacy or any
premise of infringement of personal or proprietary rights). The under-
signed also agrees that Purchaser may represent or present the life
story in any order and may elect to omit certain incidents or events
and/or persons in its sole discretion.
328. If this Depiction Release is the only agreement between the parties (Le., not with the
Owner), the amount paid for the release would be indicated here.
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2. Purchaser in its sole discretion may elect not to utilize or depict
the undersigned's life or any incidents therein in any manner whatso-
ever, if Purchaser chooses not to do so.
3. The undersigned agrees that any motion picture or program con-
taining a depiction of the undersigned's life may be produced, distrib-
uted, exhibited and publicized throughout the universe, in perpetuity,
in all languages, in any and all media now or hereafter known (includ-
ing without limitation the right to novelize the script of any such mo-
tion picture or television program).
4. The undersigned represents and warrants that he/she has the right
to enter into this agreement and to grant all rights granted hereunder;
that he/she has not previously assigned, licensed or encumbered to, or
in favor of, any third party, any of the rights granted to Purchaser
under this Agreement, and that he/she shall not endeavor to do so
after the execution of this license.
5. The undersigned agrees to indemnify and hold Purchaser, its di-
rectors, licensees connected with the project, agents, employees, suc-
cessors, and assigns, harmless from and against any and all liabilities,
claims, damages, losses, penalties, costs and expenses (including rea-
sonable counsel fees) arising out of or relating to any breach or alleged
breach of any of the representations, warranties, agreements or obliga-
tions made or undertaken by the undersigned hereunder.
6. The undersigned agrees to forever release and absolutely discharge
Purchaser, its directors, licensees connected with any project, agents,
employees, successors and assigns from any and all claims, demands,
causes of action, suits, rights, costs, losses, debts and expenses (includ-
ing attorneys' fees and costs actually incurred of any nature whatso-
ever, known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, which the
undersigned ever had, now has, or hereafter may have in any way aris-
ing out of or in connection with the project.
7. The undersigned hereby waives, to the fullest extent permitted by
law, the provisions and benefits of Section 1542 of the California Civil
Code, which statute provides in full:
"A general release does not extend to claims which the creditor does
not know or suspect to exist in his favor at the time of executing the
release, which if known by him, must have materially affected his set-
tlement with the debtor."
The undersigned acknowledges that he/she is aware that he/she may
discover facts in addition to or different from those that she now
knows or believes to be true, but that it is the undersigned's intent
hereby fully, finally, and forever to settle and release and all disputes
and differences, known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, which
now exist, or heretofore have existed between Purchaser, on the one
hand, and the undersigned on the other hand, with respect to the pro-
ject. In furtherance of such intention, the undersigned acknowledges
that the release herein given shall be and remain in effect notwithstand-
ing the discovery or existence of any such additional or different facts.
8. Purchaser is not waiving any right that it would have in the ab-
sence of this Agreement as a member of the public with respect to the
subject matter of this Agreement.329
329. Studio Agreement, supra note 277.
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The Depiction Release should always be notarized to assure that the
validity of the signature cannot be disputed. If a minor will be depicted
in the docudrama, a parent or guardian will have to execute the release
and waiver on the child's behalf. Contractual consent for minors has
been upheld by the courts, as long as the use was not repugnant to public
policy. 33
0
5. Cooperation of Owner
A provision providing for the Owner's cooperation is essential for
the development of the project.3  This provision obligates the Owner to
assist in obtaining and providing materials, personal insights, and assist-
ance in obtaining Location and Depiction Releases. 332 Farber's model is
illustrative:333
Disclosure and Consultation: Prior to the time that the option is exer-
cised, and thereafter if the Option is exercised, Owner shall, at Pur-
chaser's request, disclose to Purchaser and Purchaser's representatives,
freely, completely and candidly, all information in Owner's possession
or under Owner's control including, without limitation, copies of any
newspaper or magazine clippings, photographs, transcripts, notes, re-
cordings, or other physical materials relating to Owner's story and all
Owner's thoughts, observations, recollections, opinions, reactions and
experiences surrounding, arising out of, and concerning all those
events, circumstances, and activities, relating to Owner's story.
If Purchaser specifically requires Owner to travel or to incur telephone
expenses in connection with such disclosure or consultation, then Pur-
chaser shall reimburse Owner for reasonable out of pocket travel and
living expenses for services performed by Owner away from Owner's
home and for long distance telephone calls incurred at Purchaser's
request.
Additional Releases: Owner agrees to use Owner's best efforts to pro-
cure for Purchaser for no additional cost, those depiction releases Pur-
chaser deems necessary from individuals who are a part of Owner's life
story or depicted in any information or materials Owner may supply to
Purchaser herein. Owner agrees to use Owner's best efforts to procure
330. See, e.g., Shields v. Gross, 448 N.E.2d 108 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (Brooke Shields was
denied revocation of a release signed by her mother; photographer permitted to sell nude
photos of Shields at age ten as long as the uses were not pornographic).
331. This clause is particularly important during the option period, as it is unlikely that the
Owner would be hired as a consultant before a production commitment has been received, or
production has actually commenced. See discussion on Consultant Services, infra notes 335-
42 and accompanying text.
332. While some contracts merge cooperation with materials and cooperation with releases
into one provision, they are treated as separate provisions herein.
333. FARBER, supra note 281, §§ 63-4, 63-5, and 63-8.
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for Purchaser for no additional cost, those location releases Purchaser
deems necessary. 3
34
This provision may be used in conjunction with, or instead of, a Consult-
ant Services provision. The primary difference between the Cooperation
of Owner and Consultant Services provisions is the matter of monetary
compensation; the former requires no additional monies, whereas the lat-
ter does.
6. Consultant Services
In many situations it is beneficial to both the Owner and the Pur-
chaser to employ the Owner as a Consultant.3 35 This helps allay the
fears of the Owner 336 and provides the Purchaser with access to informa-
tion, materials, and, during the production, attention to accuracy. From
a practical standpoint, having the Owner read drafts of the teleplays and
consult during production may be problematic. If the Owner disrupts
production, it is important to have a pay-or-play provision in the con-
tract which allows the Purchaser to pay-off the Owner for the Consultant
Services without being in breach of the agreement. For example, some
studios use the following language:
No Obligation to Use: Nothing contained herein shall be construed as
requiring Purchaser to utilize any of Owner's services or to produce or
broadcast any television program based upon any story, teleplay or
other material written or presented by Owner hereunder, or to exercise
any option hereunder, or to make any use whatsoever of the results
and proceeds of Owner's services. Purchaser shall have fully dis-
charged his obligations hereunder by paying Owner any compensation
required under this Agreement.337
Pragmatically, the producer will probably get all the background
information necessary whether a Cooperation or Consultant provision is
negotiated. After all, it is in the Owner's best interests to cooperate as
much as possible in order to sell the project (i.e., the purchase price will
not be paid before there is a network sale, and usually not before a pro-
duction commitment) and to achieve an accurate and favorable por-
trayal. "The owner may use its concern over content to leverage
additional compensation for time spent consulting. ' 38  In such a case,
the Purchaser can manipulate the figures to accommodate the additional
fee by decreasing the purchase price. This provision may use the same
334. Depending on the nature of the story, the use of certain locations may be necessary or
desirable and the Owner is often in a better position to secure such releases as he or she has a
relationship with the owner of such locations and is less threatening. In today's climate, how-
ever, it is unlikely that a location release could be obtained for "no additional cost."
335. Clifford, supra note 59.
336. FARBER, supra note 281, § 63-4, comment 4.
337. Studio Agreement, supra note 277.
338. FARBER, supra note 281, § 63-5, comment 4.
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language as the Cooperation clause above or may contain more detailed
language such as the following:
Consultant Services: Consultant services shall include, but not be lim-
ited to, the following:
a. Owner shall lend Owner's best and most cooperative efforts and
knowledge to Purchaser, upon Purchaser's request from time to time,
in personal meetings and by correspondence and telephone, to provide
Purchaser with facts, data, background, and other material related to
the [Property]; and Purchaser may tape record all such discussions and
conversations.
b. Owner shall make available to Purchaser all currently extant pho-
tographs, documents and correspondence in Owner's possession or
control relating to the [Property]; and Purchaser may make copies
thereof.339
c. Owner shall cooperate with and aid Purchaser, upon Purchaser's
request from time to time, in obtaining so-called "right of privacy"
releases and location releases from persons and owners of property
Purchaser may contemplate depicting in a project based on the
[Property]. 3"°
d. Owner shall cooperate with and aid Purchaser in obtaining access
to files and information and permission and authorization to make
copies thereof relating to the [Property] and to use, to the fullest extent
such rights are available, all or any part thereof in the production,
distribution, advertising and exploitation of any project hereunder. 341
Employing the Owner as a Consultant and providing him or her
with drafts of the teleplay may serve to avoid litigation. The Owner's
objections are heard early in the production process and adjustments can
be made more easily. While a Purchaser would never relinquish creative
control to an Owner,342 this process of review may eliminate future
problems before it is too late to make changes.
339. If particular materials or types of materials are critical to developing the Property, the
Purchaser may wish to list specifically those materials in this subparagraph.
340. If releases are essential from particular individuals, the Purchaser may wish to add:
"Said 'right of privacy' releases shall include, but not be limited to, (name specific people or
categories of people) (e.g., members of Owner's immediate family, Owner's former employer,
etc.)."
341. Studio Agreement, supra note 277. Additional clauses not detailed above would pro-
vide for the fee, payment schedule, duration, and activation of the Consultant Services.
342. If an Owner insists on some degree of creative control, and the Purchaser believes it to
be a breaking point in the negotiations for a highly sought after or desirable Property, the
Purchaser may include a provision such as the following:
Creative Approval: It is acknowledged and agreed that Creative Approval in connec-
tion with the content and direction of the story shall be vested jointly with Owner
and (Purchaser's creative executive) on behalf of Purchaser. As between Purchaser
and Owner, Owner prevails only as to matters directly relating to the accuracy of
events in the Owner's life and of statements by the Owner, and Purchaser's decision
shall be final with respect to all other matters. Notwithstanding the foregoing, as
customarily required in network development agreements, the approval rights of the
network shall be final.
Studio Agreement, supra note 277.
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7. Frozen Rights, Holdback Period, Right of First Negotiation, and Right of
Last Refusal
In the event the Owner has reserved some rights, these provisions
provide the Purchaser with the ability to exploit the Purchaser's rights
without having to compete with the exploitation of the same story in
another medium. There are four components which may be part of this
clause: Frozen Rights, Holdback Period, Right of First Negotiation, and
Right of Last Refusal. The Frozen Rights provision obligates the Owner
to suspend the exercise of his or her reserved rights during the term of
the option period; the Holdback Period applies to the use of the reserved
rights in the event the Purchaser exercises the option (the length of the
Holdback Period is tied to either the production of a Project based on the
Property or the duration of a third-party license agreement); the Right of
First Negotiation provides the Purchaser with an exclusive period of time
to negotiate for the reserved rights; and the Right of Last Refusal allows
the Purchaser to match any offer the Owner receives for the reserved
rights. The following provisions are representative of an agreement in
which the television rights were acquired by the Purchaser and the theat-
rical motion picture rights were retained by the Owner:
A. Frozen Rights: During the Option period, the reserved rights in
the [Property] shall be "frozen" (l~e., the Owner may not assign, sell,
exploit or authorize others to exploit the [Property] or any elements
thereof) in any theatrical motion picture project, including but not lim-
ited to the rights to produce theatrical motion pictures based on se-
quels to the [Property] ("Frozen Rights"). In addition, in the event
Purchaser exercises the Option herein, such Frozen Rights may not be
assigned, sold or otherwise exploited during the applicable "Holdback
Period" as defined hereinbelow.
B. Holdback Period: In the event that Purchaser exercises the Op-
tion, then the Frozen Rights may not be assigned, sold or otherwise
exploited by Owner during the term of the third party licensee agree-
ment for the Project plus one (1) year following the expiration of the
term of the third party licensee agreement ("Holdback Period"). 34 3
C. Right of First Negotiation: In the event the Owner wishes to as-
sign, sell or otherwise exploit the Frozen Rights following the expira-
tion of the Holdback Period, then Purchaser shall have the right of
first negotiation in connection with any such assignment, sale or ex-
ploitation of the Frozen Rights. Purchaser's right of first negotiation
hereunder shall be exercised in accordance with and subject to the fol-
lowing procedures:
(1) If the Owner desires to dispose of the Frozen Rights (whether di-
rectly or indirectly) or the Owner desires to negotiate with a third
party in connection with such Frozen Rights, then the Owner shall, by
written notice, notify Purchaser of such desire and shall grant to Pur-
343. "Network" is often used instead of "third party licensee"; however, it is not recom-
mended as it serves to limit the Purchaser's rights.
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chaser the first and exclusive right and option for a period of (number
of days)344 days following such notice from the Owner to Purchaser to
negotiate for the acquisition of such Frozen Rights. If no agreement
has been reached between Purchaser and Owner, the Owner shall be
free to negotiate elsewhere with respect to such Frozen Rights.
D. Right of Last Refusal: In the event the Owner and Purchaser fail
to reach an agreement pursuant to the terms of subparagraph C. here-
inabove, and subsequently the Owner receives a bona fide offer from a
third party for the Frozen Rights, then Purchaser shall have the Right
of Last Refusal with regard to said third party offer. Owner shall, by
written notice, notify Purchaser of such offer and shall grant to Pur-
chaser the exclusive right for a period of (number of days) days follow-
ing such notice from Owner to Purchaser in which Purchaser may
match the terms and conditions of said offer. If Purchaser does not
match the offer within the period defined herein, then Owner shall be
free to accept said third party offer with respect to the Frozen
Rights.34 5
& Representations and Warranties
The Owner's Representations and Warranties provision provide fur-
ther protection against future litigation. In this provision, the Owner
makes the following promises: 346
(a) Owner represents and warrants that Owner has not heretofore
granted, and Owner hereby agrees that hereafter Owner shall not
grant, during the Option Term, or thereafter if the Option is exercised,
to any party, nor shall Owner exercise or authorize, or permit to be
exercised, any right to use or exploit any of the rights granted or to be
granted to Purchaser herein or in the Purchase Agreement; and that
Owner has not entered into, and shall not enter into during the afore-
said periods, any agreements or activities which will hinder, compete,
conflict, or interfere with the exercise of, or diminish, any of the rights
granted to Purchaser. Owner has no knowledge of any claim or poten-
tial claim by any party which might in any way affect Purchaser's
rights to use and exploit the rights granted or to be granted to Pur-
chaser herein or pursuant to the Purchase Agreement.
(b) Owner represents and warrants that none of the information to be
provided by Owner or on Owner's behalf is, or will be a violation of the
rights of any third party, including, without limitation, a defamation,
libel, slander or violation of any right of privacy or publicity.
344. This period may be as short as fifteen days or as long as ninety days.
345. This last provision is of particular importance when the reserved rights include all
exploitation rights in subsequent books. The Purchaser would not want to build an audience
for certain material and then see a competitor profit from that following. On the one hand,
this provision allows the Purchaser to preempt any other agreements by matching the terms of
said offers. On the other hand, an Owner who has reserved valuable rights is obviously in a
good bargaining position and will not want to grant this right. The Owner's rationale is two-
fold: the Purchaser already had his or her chance to purchase the rights via the Right of First
Negotiation, and third parties disfavor these provisions because they may have to expend time
and resources to have closed a deal, only to have it preempted by the Purchaser.
346. FARBER, supra note 281, §§ 63-7 to 63-8.
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(c) Owner represents and warrants that Owner has the right, authority
and legal capacity to grant the rights granted to Purchaser hereunder
and in the Purchase Agreement.3
47
(d) Owner shall defend, indemnify and hold Purchaser, and Pur-
chaser's employees, agents, successors, licensees and assigns, harmless
from and against any and all claims, damages, liabilities, losses or ex-
penses (including reasonable attorneys' fees and costs) which Pur-
chaser or any such party may suffer or incur arising out of or in
connection with the breach by Owner of any of the representations and
warranties set forth herein or in the Purchase Agreement.
(e) Purchaser shall defend, indemnify and hold Owner harmless from
and against any and all claims, damages, liabilities, losses or expenses
(including reasonable attorneys' fees and costs) which Owner may suf-
fer as a result of any fictional material added to the [Property] by
Purchaser. 348
9. Public Domain Protections
Finally, a Public Information or Public Domain provision should be
included in the agreement. There are two parts to this clause. The first
is applicable if the Purchaser decides not to exercise the option but to
produce a docudrama based on the Owner's story from public domain
sources.349 The following is representative: "Under no circumstances
shall Purchaser, or Purchaser's successors, licensees or assigns, be in a
less favorable situation than Purchaser would have been had Purchaser
not secured from Owner the rights described herein or in the Purchase
Agreement. ' 350 In addition, this clause may help to protect the Pur-
chaser against future litigation from the Owner if the Purchaser subse-
quently decides to produce a similar story. For example, Purchaser
acquires Owner's life story, a triumph-over-personal-tragedy story deal-
ing with Owner's miraculous recovery after he was paralyzed in a car
accident. Subsequently, Purchaser produces a triumph-over-personal-
tragedy story involving an individual who miraculously recovered from a
near fatal plane crash. Owner then claims that it is his story, except that
the facts were doctored slightly to disguise it and thus avoid paying the
purchase price. This provision serves to protect against the preemption
of an entire arena-in this scenario, physical triumph over tragedy.
347. If there is only one agreement, rather than separate option and purchase agreements,
the sentence would end after "hereunder."
348. This clause solely benefits the Owner and therefore need not be included unless specifi-
cally requested.
349. This situation may arise in a variety of ways. For example, the parties may have
negotiated an exorbitant purchase price, but the option subsequently lapsed, making the rights
unavailable. In another instance, further research may disclose that purchasing the rights is
unnecessary.
350. FARiER, supra note 281, § 63-10.
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Protective Measures and Defenses
A. Introduction
Having examined all the areas of potential liability and how they
arise, the most important question remains: What preventive measures
can a producer's attorney take to minimize the risk of liability? The pre-
ventative process is called "clearance." Every docudrama script must be
cleared before airing. In addition, the network will require the producer
to obtain errors and omissions insurance, which also requires an exten-
sive clearance procedure. Finally, should a suit be filed, the media de-
fendant should consider the available defenses: privilege, consent, and
disclaimers.
B. Script Clearance
In order to obtain errors and omissions insurance, a network re-
quirement, the producer will have to complete certain clearance analyses
intended to spot areas of potential liability.351 The insurer provides an
extensive questionnaire which requests information regarding the nature
of the project352 and provides guidelines for clearing a script, to which
the insured's attorney must use his or her best efforts to adhere.353 For
example, the Fireman's Fund Insurance Companies ("Company") appli-
cation sets forth fifteen "Clearance Procedures"; the pertinent provisions
follow:
3. If the production is in any way based on actual facts, it must be
ascertained if the source material is primary (e.g., direct interview,
court records) and not secondary (e.g., another copyrighted work).
Use of secondary sources may be permissible, but full details must be
provided to Company in an attachment to the application.
4. Written releases must be obtained from all persons who are recog-
nizable or who might reasonably claim to be identifiable in the Insured
production, or whose name, image or likeness is used, and if such per-
son is a minor, the minor's consent must be legally binding. If the
recognizable or identifiable person is deceased, releases must be ob-
tained from the personal representative of such person. Releases of the
type described in the preceding two sentences may not be required in
certain instances, but full details must be provided Company in an at-
tachment to the application. Releases are not necessary if the recog-
351. Gerdes, supra note 14, at 36.
352. The production must be categorized as: (1) entirely fictional; (2) entirely fictional, but
inspired by specific events and/or occurrences; (3) a portrayal of actual events which includes
significant fictionalization; (4) a true portrayal of actual facts or happenings; or (5) other than
above. Fireman's Fund Insurance Companies, Motion Picture, Radio and Television Producers
Liability Insurance Schedule and Application, at 2 [hereinafter Fireman's Fund].
353. Id. at 1.
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nizable person is part of a crowd or background shot and his image is
not shown for more than a few seconds or given special emphasis....
7. All releases must give the Insured the right to edit, modify, add to
and/or delete any or all of the material supplied by the releasor. Re-
leases from recognizable persons must grant the Insured the right to
fictionalize the Insured's portrayal of the releasor....
13. It must be determined that the Insured production does not con-
tain any material which constitutes defamation, invasion of privacy or
violation of the right of publicity or of any other right of any person,
firm, or corporation.354
In addition, in assessing the potential liabilities, the application
states, "Is there a plausible risk that a living person could claim (without
regard to the merits) to be identifiable in the production (whether or not
the person's name or likeness is used or the production purports to be
fictional)? ' 355 Part of the clearance process requires the writer to pro-
vide an "annotated script" which indicates the source of information for
all dialogue, scenes, and characters.35 6 Dialogue may be invented, but
the writer must show that its "creation can be supported by the source's
information or that such dialogue is innocuous. '3 57 Scenes are analyzed
in the same way. At least one network, ABC,
requires that locations, circumstances and the chronology of events be
accurate, and that evidence supporting their accuracy be submitted
with the annotated script. Although events may be telescoped, they
must be chronologically accurate, and events that did not occur cannot
be invented. Furthermore, the passage of time must be clearly indi-
cated, by dialogue, supers, dissolves or other visual techniques. 358
Each character must be "categorized as living, dead, real, fictional or
composite. ' ' 359 In addition, a character's demeanor, attitude and per-
sonal characteristics must be supported; and if a portrayal is particularly
uncomplimentary or controversial, a more detailed investigation will be
required. 3 ° The review process is extensive and multi-layered. At ABC,
for example, the docudrama is reviewed numerous times through every
stage of development from treatment through final cut.3 61 This clearance
process should preclude any claim of defamation by a public figure or
official (because plaintiff will not be able to prove "reckless disregard for
the truth"), and will make it very unlikely that a private figure could
354. Id. at 2.
355. Id. at 1.
356. Gerdes, supra note 14, at 36.
357. Id.
358. Sobel, supra note 4, at 6.
359. Gerdes, supra note 14, at 36.
360. Sobel, supra note 4, at 6.
361. Id. "[A]pplicant and its counsel must continually monitor the production at all
stages, and in light of any special circumstances, to make certain that the production contains
no material which could give rise to a claim." Fireman's Fund, supra note 352, at 3.
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prevail upon a showing of negligence. The clearance process will also
highlight potential suits for invasion of privacy, copyright infringement,
and false light, and the risks can be weighed against the importance of
the material, pursuant to the analyses above.
Even in the event that new characters are created, or the characters'
names and locales have been changed, additional protective measures are
advised (and most likely mandated by the insurer). Companies, such as
de Forest Research, Inc., research the potential legal risks which may
result from a production. The service covers many areas, including
checking "all character names to ensure that those selected do not iden-
tify actual persons; all fictitious business names to ensure that your imag-
inary corporation does not have a real-life counterpart; all product
references for possible trademark and/or copyright infringement. 362
This is a critical part of the clearance process because coincidental identi-
fications may result in litigation. For example, in Smith v. Huntington
Publishing Co., 363 the defendant wrote an article about a woman and her
drug-addicted son. As agreed upon with the actual subjects, the names
used in the articles were fictitious. By coincidence, the fictitious names
chosen were the same as the plaintiffs (mother and son), and the boy
described matched the son's age and general description. Although the
defendant prevailed, partially as a result of a disclaimer, it is costly to
defend any claim, and particularly unnecessary when the basis for the
suit may be so easily avoided.
C. Defenses
The primary defenses available to a media defendant are privilege,
when rights are not secured, and consent, when rights have been ob-
tained. As discussed above, the First Amendment privilege provides the
media defendant with a great deal of protection against claims for defa-
mation, invasion of privacy, and related torts. Meticulous clearance pro-
cedures should provide ample evidence to rebut a charge of actual malice
or reckless disregard of the truth. Similarly, careful drafting of releases
and waivers should provide considerable protection against tort liability
when the parties have consented to media portrayal. The remaining pro-
tective measure or defense which warrants discussion is the disclaimer.
Disclaimers are used to shield producers from suits involving defa-
mation and invasion of privacy. The disclaimer attempts to explain away
liability by informing the viewer that any similarities between fictional
characters and real people are purely coincidental, a program is purely
362. de Forest Research, Inc. promotional brochure, at 1.
363. 410 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D. Ohio), a.f'd, 535 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1975).
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fictitious, the presentation is from a particular perspective (author, par-
ticipant, or attorney), artistic license has been taken with the facts, or
characters may be composites or strictly fictional. 3" For example,
ABC's telecast of Marilyn: The Untold Story was preceded by the dis-
claimer, "The following is a dramatization of the life of Marilyn Monroe,
based on the book by Norman Mailer and other sources. Some compos-
ite characters and time compression have been used for dramatic
purposes. ' 36
5
There are primarily two types of cases which arise where courts
have applied the use of a disclaimer as a defense: fictitious names cases
and character fictionalizations. 3  When the plaintiff sues over the coin-
cidental use of his or her name, the media defendant will most likely
prevail. "The courts generally have agreed that when names have been
changed ... absent convincing indicators that the subject of the report
was the complainant, a disclaimer manifesting in general terms the types
of changes made is sufficient to preclude liability., 367 The basis of the
decisions is that the plaintiff will be unable to prove the characterization
is of and concerning him or her.
The more problematic use arises when the disclaimer pertains to fic-
tionalized elements of a fact-based story. Since a docudrama purports to
contain both fact and fiction, the plaintiff will have an easier time assert-
ing that the portrayal is of and concerning him or her. In analyzing these
sorts of claims, the courts consider the relative significance of the charac-
ter to the production.36 If the character played a relatively small part in
the docudrama, courts are unwilling to assess liability.3 69 If the charac-
ter is more prominent and there is a relationship between the defendant
and plaintiff, a disclaimer alone will not avoid liability.37 Ultimately,
disclaimers should be regarded merely as supplemental devices and
should not be relied upon in lieu of careful clearance procedures. 371
364. Gerdes, supra note 14, at 58.
365. Sobel, supra note 4, at 6.
366. Casenote, The Legal Effect of Disclaimers of Liability on Motion Pictures Based on
Fact, 8 GLENDALE L. REv. 74, 77 (1980).
367. Id. at 79.
368. Id. at 84 ("the law does not care for, or take notice of, very small or trifling matters").
369. Id.
370. Id. at 86. See, e.g., Fetler v. Houghton Mifflin, 364 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1966) (novel
character resembled author's brother too closely to overcome disclaimer); Bindrim v. Mitchell,
155 Cal. Rptr. 29 (Ct. App. 1979) (those who knew plaintiff could identify him as character in
novel). But see also Davis v. Costa-Gavras, 654 F. Supp. 653, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("minor
fictionalization cannot be considered evidence or support for the requirement of actual
malice").
371. Gerdes, supra note 14, at 58.
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Conclusion
There is great potential for litigation in the production of
docudramas. The easiest way for the producer to avoid liability is by
securing all rights in the subject matter depicted. Careful drafting of the
acquisition agreement and depiction releases can virtually eliminate all
potential risks. In circumstances where acquiring rights is not always
feasible or desirable, a producer may utilize public domain sources. In
those instances, the potential liabilities (e.g., defamation, invasion of pri-
vacy, etc.) may be mitigated through diligent clearance procedures and
careful legal analyses. It is clear that the popularity of docudramas will
continue, and consequently, the financial incentives for producers and
distributors will insure their continued production. As society becomes
more litigious, and the complexities of acquiring rights and protecting
against tort litigation increase proportionately, the role of the attorney is
increasingly becoming an integral part of the creative process of produc-
ing docudramas.
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